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Carbon	Credits	As	EU	Like	It:	Property,	Immunity,	TragiCO2medy?	
	
Kelvin	FK	Low	&	Jolene	Lin**	
	
ABSTRACT	
	
While	there	have	been	many	legal	studies	of	the	European	Union	Emissions	Trading	
Scheme,	few	have	considered	the	effectiveness	of	the	EU	ETS	as	a	matter	of	private	
law	 design.	 The	 authors	 propose	 to	 do	 so	 by	 tracing	 the	 history	 of	 the	 scheme,	
studying	 the	English	decision	of	Armstrong	DLW	GmbH	v	Winnington	Networks	Ltd	
[2012]	 EWHC	 10	 (Ch),	 [2013]	 Ch	 156,	 as	 well	 as	 analysing	 the	 new	 EU	 Registry	
Regulations	promulgated	since	 then.	We	conclude	 that	 the	EU	ETS	 is	handicapped	
by	 conceptual	 failings	 and	 exposes	 participants	 to	 unnecessary	 uncertainty	 that	
national	courts	will	find	difficult	to	resolve.	
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1.	INTRODUCTION	
	
The	 first	 and	 the	 largest	 regional	 greenhouse	 gas	 (GHG)	 emissions	 trading	
scheme	 in	 the	world,	 the	 European	Union	Emissions	Trading	 Scheme	 (EU	ETS)	 is	
widely	considered	to	be	the	central	pillar	of	the	EU’s	comprehensive	package	of	laws	
and	policies	addressing	climate	change	–	the	European	Climate	Change	Programme	
(ECCP).1	Whilst	 its	 objectives	 are	 laudable,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	ETS	 has	
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1 	Europa,	 Commission	 of	 the	 EU,	 ‘European	 Climate	 Change	 Programme’	
<ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/eccp/index_en.htm>	accessed	20	February	2015.	For	
discussion,	 see	 Tim	 Maxian	 Rusche,	 ‘The	 European	 climate	 change	 program:	 An	
evaluation	of	stakeholder	 involvement	and	policy	achievements’	(2010)	38	Energy	
Policy	 6349.	 The	 ECCP	 has	 facilitated	 the	 adoption	 of	 numerous	 directives	 for	
promoting	 renewable	 energy,	 biofuels,	 recovering	 methane	 from	 biodegradable	
waste	in	landfills,	amongst	others;		Council	Directive	(EC)	2001/77	of	27	September	
2001	on	 the	promotion	of	 electricity	 produced	 from	 renewable	 energy	 sources	 in	
the	 internal	electricity	market	[2001]	OJ	L283/33;	Council	Directive	(EC)	2003/30	
of	8	May	2003	on	the	promotion	of	the	use	of	biofuels	or	other	renewable	fuels	for	
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2627950 
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been	 beset	with	 complications.2	Although	many	 of	 these	 problems	 are	 extra‐legal,	
this	article	posits	 that	one	of	the	critical	 failures	 in	the	EU	ETS	lies	 in	its	 failure	to	
properly	define	 the	 fundamental	 legal	 nature	of	 an	allowance	 (an	EUA)	under	 the	
scheme.	Ostensibly,	 this	 omission	 is	 a	 concession	 to	 the	principle	 of	 subsidiarity.3	
However,	we	suggest	that	it	stems	also	from	a	failure	to	appreciate	the	legal	nature	
of	intangible	property	as	well	as	a	misunderstanding	of	the	way	in	which	registers	of	
rights	 operate.	Whereas	 some	 of	 the	 extra‐legal	 failings	 of	 the	 system	 have	 been	
mended	 following	 amendments	 implemented	 after	 the	 project	 entered	 its	 third	
phase,4	it	will	be	seen	that	some	of	these	changes	have	actually	exacerbated	the	legal	
failings	of	the	EU	ETS.		
Part	2	of	this	article	will	set	the	stage	by	introducing	the	context	in	which	the	
EU	ETS	came	to	be	set	up	as	well	as	present	the	problems	we	are	concerned	with	in	
the	abstract.	These	are	essentially	private	law	disputes	involving	participants	in	the	
EU	ETS.	Part	3	will	study	one	of	these	problems	through	a	case	study	of	Armstrong	
DLW	GmbH	v	Winnington	Networks	Ltd	(Armstrong	v	Winnington),5	to	date	 the	only	
case	that	seeks	to	tackle	the	difficult	question	of	the	legal	nature	of	an	EUA.	Part	4	
will	 then	 critically	 examine	 the	 new	 rules	 governing	 the	 EU	 ETS	 that	 have	 been	
enacted	 following	 Armstrong	 v	Winnington	 and	 explain	 how	 they	 exacerbate	 the	
problems	caused	by	the	ambiguity	of	the	legal	nature	of	an	EUA.	
2.	SETTING	THE	STAGE	
There	 are	 two	main	 types	 of	 emissions	 trading	 programs	 –	 ‘cap‐and‐trade’	
and	‘baseline	credit’	systems.6	The	EU	ETS	is	built	on	the	‘cap	and	trade’	model.	In	a	
																																																																																																																																																																					
transport	 [2003]	OJ	L123/42;	Council	Directive	(EC)	1999/31	of	26	April	1999	on	
the	landfill	of	waste	[1999]	OJ	L182/1.	
2 	See,	 eg,	 Marius‐Christian	 Frunza,	 Fraud	 and	 Carbon	 Markets:	 The	 Carbon	
Connection	(Routledge	2013).	
3	For	a	general	study	of	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	and	environmental	policy,	see	
Jonathan	Golub,	 ‘Sovereignty	 and	Subsidiarity	 in	EU	Environmental	 Policy’	 (1996)	
44	Political	Studies	686.	
4	Peter	Zaman,	‘The	new	Registries	Regulation	–	form	over	substance?’	(ReedSmith,	1	
October	 2012)	 <www.reedsmith.com/The‐new‐Registries‐Regulation‐‐form‐over‐
substance‐10‐17‐2012/>	accessed	20	February	2015	
5	[2012]	EWHC	10	(Ch),	[2013]	Ch	156.	
6	R	 Kerry	 Turner,	 David	 Pearce	 and	 Ian	 Bateman	 Environmental	 Economics:	 An	
Elementary	 Introduction	 (John	 Hopkins	 University	 Press	 1993)	 181.	 There	 is	 a	
voluminous	 literature	 on	 emissions	 trading.	 See,	 generally,	 OECD,	 ‘Implementing	
Domestic	 Tradable	 Permits	 for	 Environmental	 Protection’	 (OECD	 1999);	 Joseph	
Kruger,	 ‘Companies	and	Regulators	in	Emissions	Trading	Programs’	(Resources	for	
the	 Future,	 2005)	Discussion	 Paper	 05‐03;	 European	 Environment	 Agency,	 ‘Using	
the	Market	 for	 Cost‐Effective	 Environmental	 Policy’	 (EEA,	 2006);	 Robert	W	Hahn	
and	Gordon	L	Hester,	‘Where	did	all	the	markets	go?	An	Analysis	of	EPA’s	Emissions	
Trading	Program’	(1989)	6	Yale	Journal	on	Regulation	109.		
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cap	and	trade	scheme,	the	regulator	determines	an	acceptable	level	of	emissions,	i.e.	
a	 ‘cap’.	 In	order	for	the	scheme	to	achieve	the	objective	of	reducing	emissions,	 the	
cap	has	 to	be	 set	 at	 a	 level	 that	 is	 lower	 than	 ‘business	as	usual’	 emissions	 levels.	
Once	 the	 cap	 is	 established,	 allowances	 that	 permit	 the	 emission	 of	 GHGs	will	 be	
allocated	 amongst	 firms.	 Thus,	within	 the	EU	ETS,	 the	 subject	 of	 regulation	 is	 the	
installation	 emitting	 GHGs	 into	 the	 atmosphere.	 Each	 installation	 is	 allocated	 a	
specific	 amount	 of	 tradable	 allowances	 (EUAs)	 for	 a	 certain	 trading	 period.	 Each	
installation	 is	required	to	annually	monitor,	measure	and	report	 its	emissions	and	
surrender	an	amount	of	EUAs	equivalent	to	its	emissions	in	the	preceding	year.		
	
A	firm	that	wishes	to	emit	more	than	its	allocation	of	EUAs	has	to	purchase	
additional	 allowances.	Otherwise,	 it	will	 exceed	 its	quota	 and	 thereby	 incur	 tough	
monetary	 penalties.7	Trading	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 firms	 are	
economically	rational	profit‐maximising	actors:	a	firm	that	can	abate	pollution	at	a	
cost	lower	than	the	market	price	of	an	allowance	will	do	so	up	to	the	level	where	the	
price	 of	 abatement	 is	 equal	 to	 the	 allowance	 price.	 It	 then	 sells	 its	 surplus	
allowances	 to	 firms	 that	 find	 it	 more	 costly	 to	 reduce	 pollution	 than	 to	 buy	
allowances	 to	meet	emission	 targets.	Cost‐effectiveness	 is	achieved	when	all	 firms	
abate	 to	 the	 point	where	 the	marginal	 costs	 of	 further	 abatement	 is	 equal	 to	 the	
permit	 price.	 The	 long‐term	 goal	 of	 a	 cap	 and	 trade	 system	 is	 to	 reduce	 total	
emissions	 to	 a	 level	 below	 that	 established	 by	 the	 cap.8	This	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	
gradually	reducing	the	level	of	emissions	represented	by	the	‘cap’.	
	
2.1	 PHASED	DEVELOPMENT	OF	THE	EU	ETS		
The	 European	 Commission	 put	 forward	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 community‐wide	
emissions	 trading	 scheme	 as	 early	 as	 1999.9	The	 details	 of	 the	 scheme	 were	
finalized	in	October	2003	and	the	EU	ETS	came	into	operation	on	1	January	2005.10	
The	EU	ETS	was	designed	to	develop	in	phases.11	The	first	phase	was	from	2005	to	
2007;	 the	second	phase	 from	2008‐2012	and	the	current	 third	phase	started	on	1	
																																																								
7	The	 installation	 will	 have	 to	 purchase	 allowances	 to	 make	 up	 the	 shortfall	 in	
addition	to	paying	a	penalty	of	100	Euro	per	tonne	of	carbon	dioxide	equivalent.	In	
Billerud	Karlsborg	v	Naturvardsverket	 (C203/12,	 17	 October	 2013),	 the	 European	
Court	of	Justice	ruled	in	2013	that	Member	States	must	impose	these	penalties,	even	
when	there	was	no	intention	to	circumvent	the	rules.		
8	Turner,	Pearce	and	Bateman	(n	6)	183.		
9 	Commission,	 ‘Preparing	 for	 Implementation	 of	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol’	
(Communication)	COM	(99)	230	final,	19	May	1999.		
10	Council	 Directive	 (EC)	 2003/87	 of	 13	 October	 2003	 establishing	 a	 scheme	 for	
greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 allowance	 trading	within	 the	 Community	 and	 amending	
Council	Directive	96/61/EC	[2003]	OJ	L275/32.	[EU	ETS	Directive]	
11	Art	 30(2)	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	Directive	 stipulates	 that	 the	 Commission	 is	 to	 prepare	
reports	and	proposals	to	include	more	activities	and	cover	more	greenhouse	gases	
within	the	EU	ETS	over	time.			
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January	2013	and	will	run	till	2020.	In	the	first	phase,	the	EU	ETS	already	regulated	
approximately	 five	 thousand	 economic	 operators	 responsible	 for	 around	 twelve	
thousand	 installations	 in	 four	 sectors:	 energy	 (including	 electricity	 producers),	
ferrous	 metals	 (iron	 and	 steel),	 minerals	 (cement,	 glass,	 ceramics)	 and	 pulp	 and	
paper.12	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	while	the	number	of	installations	involved	
in	 the	EU	ETS	appears	 large,	 there	 is	merely	a	handful	of	participants	engaging	 in	
spot‐market	 transactions. 13 	These	 participants	 are	 predominantly	 energy	
companies.14	Nonetheless,	when	 it	was	 first	 launched,	 the	EU	ETS	already	covered	
half	of	all	carbon	dioxide	emissions	in	the	EU.15	In	the	current	phase,	the	EU	ETS	has	
been	enlarged	 to	 include	new	sectors	 such	as	 aviation	and	 the	overall	 target	 is	 to	
reduce	GHG	emissions	by	20%	from	1990	levels.		
2.2	 THE	‘COMMUNITY	INDEPENDENT	TRANSACTION	LOG’		
In	order	to	have	a	system	of	tradable	allowances,	member	states	allocate	allowances	
to	 economic	 entities	 and	 establish	 electronic	 registries	 in	which	 these	 allowances	
are	 held.16	The	 Commission	maintains	 oversight	 of	 the	 distribution	 of	 allowances.		
The	‘Community	Independent	Transaction	Log’	(CITL)	was	a	system	used	to	oversee	
the	 national	 registries	 by	 monitoring	 transactions	 for	 irregularities.	 Carlarne	
describes	 the	 CITL	 as	 such:	 ‘[t]he	 system	 resembles	 bank	 operations	 except	 that	
instead	 of	 monitoring	 the	 movement	 and	 ownership	 of	 money,	 it	 monitors	 the	
ownership	 and	 movement	 of	 emission	 allowances’.17	With	 the	 unification	 of	 the	
national	 registries	 in	 the	 current	 third	 phase	 of	 the	 scheme,	 the	 CITL	 has	 been	
replaced	by	the	‘European	Union	Transaction	Log’	(EUTL).	
2.3	 WHAT	IS	AN	EUA?	
																																																								
12	Annex	I,	EU	ETS	Directive.			
13	In	the	years	2005‐2006,	just	three	operators	accounted	for	more	than	ten	percent	
of	 all	 spot‐market	 transactions	 and	 another	 eight	 accounted	 for	 the	 next	 twenty	
percent	of	the	market:	Stefan	E	Weishaar	and	Edwin	Woerdman,	‘Auctioning	EU	ETS	
allowances:	An	assessment	of	market	manipulation	from	the	perspective	of	Law	and	
Economics’	(2012)	3	Climate	Law	247.		
14	ibid.		
15	A	 Denny	 Ellerman	 and	 Barbara	 K	 Buchner,	 ‘The	 European	 Union	 Emissions	
Trading	 Scheme:	 Origins,	 Allocation,	 and	 Early	 Results’	 (2007)	 1	 Review	 of	
Environmental	Economics	and	Policy	66.		
16	In	 the	 first	 phase,	 Member	 States	 were	 responsible	 for	 creating	 ‘National	
Allocation	Plans’	which	indicated	the	amount	of	allowances	that	each	Member	State	
proposed	 to	 allocate	 and	 the	 method	 of	 allocating	 the	 allowances	 amongst	 the	
companies	that	were	emitting	greenhouse	gases.	However,	due	to	problems	of	non‐
transparency	 and	 the	over‐allocation	of	 allowances	by	 states,	 the	 rules	have	been	
changed.	In	the	current	phase	(2013‐2020),	there	is	a	single	EU‐wide	allowance	cap	
and	the	Commission	laid	down	harmonized	rules	for	allocation	of	allowances.		
17	Cinnamon	Pinon	Carlarne,	Climate	Change	Law	and	Policy:	EU	and	US	Approaches	
(OUP	2010)	172.		
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Apart	from	defining	‘allowance’	in	Article	3,	the	EU	ETS	Directive	was	silent	
as	to	the	legal	nature	of	the	EUA.	Article	3	of	the	directive	defines	an	allowance	as	
‘an	 allowance	 to	 emit	 one	 tonne	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 equivalent	 during	 a	 specified	
period,	which	 shall	be	valid	only	 for	 the	purposes	of	meeting	 the	 requirements	of	
this	 Directive	 and	 shall	 be	 transferable	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 provisions	 of	 this	
Directive’.		
	 An	early	draft	proposal	of	the	EU	ETS	Directive	defined	an	‘allowance’	as	an	
‘administrative	authorization’,	a	definition	that	is	common	in	US	emissions	trading	
schemes	 such	 as	 the	 sulphur	 dioxide	 emissions	 trading	 scheme	 set	 up	 under	 the	
Clean	 Air	 Act	 of	 1990.18	However,	 the	 Legal	 Service	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	
rejected	this	definition	of	an	‘allowance’	as	it	was	perceived	to	be	in	conflict	with	the	
principle	 of	 subsidiarity.19	Therefore,	 it	 is	 up	 to	 each	Member	 State	 to	 define	 the	
EUA’s	 legal	 status.	A	holder	of	EUAs	 ‘will	have	 to	 turn	 to	domestic	 legislation	and	
judicial	 precedents	 to	 find	 out	 the	 level	 of	 legal	 authorization,	 ownership,	
obligations,	 liabilities,	 and/or	protection	provided	 for	under	domestic	 law	 for	 any	
kind	of	EUA‐related	activity	 in	any	given	 legal	context	(such	as	contract,	property,	
security,	insolvency,	state	aid,	accounting,	or	tax	law)’.20	The	rejection	of	the	dubious	
definition	found	in	the	US	Clean	Air	Act	is	probably	a	blessing	in	hindsight.	Section	
403(f)	 has	 been	 criticized	 as	 being	 ‘premised	 on	 the	 confusion	 between	 property	
rights	 in	something	and	the	thing	 itself.	 It	provides	that	an	emissions	allowance	 is	
not	 “a	 property	 right”	 but	 expressly	 recognizes	 property	 rights	 in	 emission	
allowances’” 21 	The	 ‘definition’	 was	 intended	 to	 avoid	 subsequent	 legislative	
amendments	to	the	scheme	being	treated	as	a	taking	under	the	Fifth	Amendment	of	
the	US	Constitution.22	While	the	objective	is	laudable	and	there	is	in	principle	to	be	
no	 objection	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 defeasible	 property,23	it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 a	 simple	
definitional	 exclusion	 of	 property	 status	 by	 Congress	 would	 have	 the	 effect	 of	
excluding	 the	 operation	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 by	 itself.24	Whilst	 this	 frees	 the	
																																																								
18	Section	403(f)	Clean	Air	Act	(42	USC	7651b).		
19	Markus	 Pohlmann,	 ‘The	 European	 Union	 Emissions	 Trading	 Scheme’	 in	 David	
Freestone	 and	Charlotte	 Streck	 (eds),	Legal	Aspects	of	Carbon	Trading	 (OUP	2009)	
350.		
20	ibid	351.		
21	Daniel	 H	 Cole,	 ‘Cleaning	 the	 Air:	 Four	 Propositions	 About	 Property	 Rights	 and	
Environmental	Protection’	(1999)	10	Duke	Environmental	Law	&	Policy	Forum	103,	
113‐114.	
22	Markus	W	Gehring	 and	Charlotte	 Streck,	 ‘Emissions	Trading:	 Lessons	 From	SOx	
and	NOx	Emissions	Allowance	and	Credit	Systems	Legal	Nature,	Title,	Transfer,	and	
Taxation	 of	 Emission	 Allowances	 and	 Credits’	 (2005)	 35	 Environmental	 Law	
Reporter	10220,	10221‐10222.	
23	Cole	(n	21)	114‐115.	
24	City	of	Boerne	v	Flores,	 521	 US	 507,	 117	 S	 Ct	 2157	 (1997),	 especially	 at	 2164:	
‘Congress	does	not	enforce	a	constitutional	right	by	changing	what	the	right	is.	It	has	
been	given	the	power	“to	enforce,”	not	 the	power	to	determine	what	constitutes	a	
constitutional	violation.’	
6	
	
various	national	courts	in	the	EU	to	call	a	spade	a	spade,	the	classification	of	carbon	
credits	 as	 property25	does	 not	 begin	 to	 provide	 clear	 answers	 to	 a	 multitude	 of	
questions.	Refusing	to	clarify	the	legal	nature	of	EUAs	on	account	of	the	principle	of	
subsidiarity,	it	will	be	seen,	leaves	much	to	be	desired.		
First,	since	EUAs	are	intended	to	be	traded	across	member	states,	the	lack	of	
a	uniform	legal	nature	across	member	states	is,	at	the	very	least,	curious.	This	is	not	
the	same	objection	as	the	more	familiar	criticism	that	EUAs	do	not	enjoy	a	uniform	
legal	status	across	member	states.	Different	jurisdictions	regulate	trading	differently	
depending	 on	 their	 classification	 of	 EUAs	 as	 either	 financial	 instruments	 or	 as	
commodities.	 EUAs	 also	 attract	 different	 accounting	 and	 tax	 treatments	 across	
member	 states.	 While	 discrepancies	 in	 status	may	 hinder	 cross	 border	 trades	 of	
EUAs,	differing	views	of	EUAs’	 legal	nature,	 such	as	whether	 they	are	 regarded	as	
property	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 regulatory	 takings,	what	 amounts	 to	 an	 interference	
with	an	EUA	and	how	competing	claims	to	the	same	EUAs	are	resolved,	would	pose	
far	 more	 serious	 obstacles	 to	 such	 trade.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 the	 differences	
between	property	rights	 in	tangible	 things	and	 intangible	property	 in	 this	respect.	
People	buy	cars	so	 they	may	use	 them	and	the	rights	afforded	by	 legal	systems	 to	
owners	secure	their	usage	but	the	car	is	quite	separable	from	the	legal	rights	to	it.	
Intangible	property,	on	the	other	hand,	is	inseparable	from	the	legal	rights	created	
by	a	legal	system	for	the	right	itself	is	the	property.	Thus,	whilst	it	may	be	a	matter	
of	 some	 inconvenience	 to	 an	 owner	driving	 from	England	 to	France	 that	his	 legal	
rights	to	his	car	will	be	protected	differently	in	France	as	compared	to	England,	the	
car	 itself	 does	 not	 fundamentally	 change	 in	 nature	 at	 the	 border	 crossing.	 If,	
however,	 the	 right	 is	 the	 thing	 itself	 and	 the	 precise	 rights	 change	 upon	 transfer	
across	borders,	this	would	reflect	an	entirely	different	phenomenon	altogether.	Such	
a	 phenomenon,	 whilst	 not	 impossible	 to	 contemplate,	 has	 certainly	 never	 been	
encountered	before	the	establishment	of	the	EU	ETS.	Intellectual	property	rights,	for	
example,	 never	 cross	 borders.	 Greek	 copyright	 is	 a	 quite	 distinct	 construct	 from	
Italian	copyright	and	while	an	Italian	company	may	acquire	a	Greek	copyright,	the	
right	 itself	 does	 not	 ‘move’	 to	 Italy.	 Contractual	 choses	 in	 action,	 even	 if	 traded	
across	 borders,	 remain	 fundamentally	 governed	 by	 their	 proper	 law	 so	 far	 as	
enforcement	is	concerned.	The	proper	law	of	a	contract	may	be	changed	but	only	by	
the	 consent	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 contract,	 not	 by	 the	 right	 changing	 hands.	 A	
chameleonic	 intangible	 property	 capable	 of	 crossing	 borders	 thus	 presents	
problems	 never	 before	 encountered	 and	 from	 which	 no	 proper	 analogy	 may	 be	
drawn.	
Secondly,	unless	a	Member	State	enacts	legislation	clarifying	the	legal	nature	
of	EUAs,	users	of	the	EU	ETS	are	left	in	a	state	of	legal	limbo.	This	would	not	be	the	
first	 occasion	 in	 which	 the	 Community	 legislature	 has	 created	 poorly‐defined	
‘rights’.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 EU	milk	 quotas,	 Advocate	 General	 Colomer	 opined	 that	
‘[t]he	Community	legislature	must	have	believed	that	it	could	simply	regulate	these	
instruments	according	 to	 their	purpose,	namely	 to	 control	milk	production	within	
																																																								
25	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[31].	
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the	Community,	and	leave	it	 to	each	Member	State	to	resolve	the	complex	private‐
law	issues	which	the	introduction	of	the	new	scheme	would	inevitably	raise.’26	The	
problem	 with	 such	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 design	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 is	 that,	 unlike	 milk	
quotas,	 which	 were	 primarily	 designed	 as	 a	 means	 of	 production	 control	 but	
evolved	 through	 market	 practice	 into	 tradeable	 assets,	 EUAs	 were	 primarily	
designed	 as	 a	 means	 of	 emission	 control	 through	a	 trading	 system.	 According	 to	
INTERPOL,	 ‘carbon	 credits	 [are]	 poorly	 understood	 by	 many	 sellers,	 buyers	 and	
traders.	This	lack	of	understanding	makes	carbon	trading	particularly	vulnerable	to	
fraud	 and	 other	 illegal	 activity.	 Carbon	markets,	 like	 other	 financial	 markets,	 are	
also	at	risk	of	exploitation	by	criminals	due	to	the	large	amount	of	money	invested,	
the	 immaturity	 of	 the	 regulations	 and	 lack	 of	 oversight	 and	 transparency.’27	The	
illegal	activities	identified	by	INTERPOL	include:28	
(i)		 Fraudulent	 manipulation	 of	 measurements	 to	 claim	 more	 carbon	
credits	from	a	project	than	were	actually	obtained;	
(ii)		 Sale	of	 carbon	 credits	 that	 either	do	not	 exist	 or	belong	 to	 someone	
else;	
(iii)		 False	 or	 misleading	 claims	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 environmental	 or	
financial	benefits	of	carbon	market	investments;	
(iv)	 Exploitation	 of	 weak	 regulations	 in	 the	 carbon	 market	 to	 commit	
financial	 crimes,	 such	 as	 money	 laundering,	 securities	 fraud	 or	 tax	
fraud;	and	
(v)		 Computer	 hacking/phishing	 to	 steal	 carbon	 credits	 and	 theft	 of	
personal	information.	
Without	clarity	as	to	the	precise	rights	that	attach	to	an	EUA,	including	how	
one’s	 ownership	 of	 an	 EUA	 is	 protected	 from	 divestment,	 whether	 by	 fraud	 or	
otherwise,	 market	 participants	 can	 only	 guess	 at	 how	 the	 ‘complex	 private‐law	
issues’	raised	by	such	illegal	activities	will	be	resolved.	These	include	the	following,	
non‐exhaustive,	hypothetical	scenarios:		
(1) If	EUAs	obtained	through	the	 fraudulent	manipulation	of	measurements	
from	 a	 project	 were	 sold,	 will	 the	 buyer	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 the	 EUAs	
towards	its	emissions?		
																																																								
26	European	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 Stefan	Demand	v	Hauptzollamt	Trier,	 C‐186/96,	 ECR	
(1998):	I‐8529.	Opinion	of	the	Advocate	General	Ruiz‐Jarabo	Colomer	delivered	on	7	
July	1998.		
27	INTERPOL	 Environmental	 Crime	 Programme,	 ‘Guide	 to	 Carbon	 Trading	 Crime’	
(INTERPOL	 June	 2013)	 11,	 available	 at	 <www.interpol.int/Media/Files/Crime‐
areas/Environmental‐crime/Guide‐to‐Carbon‐Trading‐Crime‐2013>	 accessed	 20	
February	2015	
28	ibid	11.	
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(2) If	a	bona	fide	buyer	were	to	sell	on	the	same	EUAs,	will	he	incur	liability	
towards	his	buyer	should	the	latter	find	that	he	is	unable	to	do	so?		
	
(3) When,	if	ever,	will	a	buyer	of	EUAs	that	do	not	exist	be	able	to	apply	them	
towards	its	emissions?		
	
(4) What	if	EUAs	belonging	to	A	were	sold	by	B	to	C?		
	
(i) Should	 the	 EUAs	 be	 restored	 to	 A	 or	 should	 C	 be	 allowed	 to	 retain	
them	and	either	apply	them	towards	its	emissions	or	further	trade	
in	them?		
	
(ii) If	restoration	is	either	impossible	or	not	sought	by	A,	will	A	have	any	
private‐law	recourse	against	C?		
	
(iii) What	would	the	basis	of	any	private‐law	recourse	(if	any)	against	
B	be?		
The	 EU	 ETS	 provides	 no	 answers	 to	 any	 of	 these,	 and	 other,	 important	
questions.		
Thirdly,	 and	 assuming	 that	 EUAs	 are	 properly	 regarded	 as	 the	 subject	 of	
property	 rights,	 the	 failure	 to	 prescribe	 some	 of	 the	 key	 rules	 relating	 to	 their	
operation	represent	a	missed	opportunity	at	optimising	the	operation	of	the	EU	ETS.	
Take	 the	 simple	question	on	how	a	 legal	 system	 is	 to	 ascribe	 loss	as	between	 the	
original	owner	of	a	property	and	its	bona	fide	purchaser.	A	rule,	such	as	the	English	
common	 law’s	 default	 nemo	dat	 rule	 would	 favour	 static	 security.	 Static	 security	
preserves	existing	allocation	of	property	by	ensuring	that	owners	are	not	deprived	
of	their	property	by	another’s	acts.	29	However,	considering	the	entire	premise	of	the	
EU	ETS	 is	 that	 the	 facilitation	of	 trade	 in	EUAs	will	 lead	 to	 the	most	economically	
efficient	means	of	reduction	of	production	of	carbon	dioxide	emissions,	it	is	arguable	
that	 the	 EU	 ETS	 ought	 to	 prefer	 dynamic	 security	 over	 static	 security.	 Dynamic	
security	 favours	 bona	 fide	 purchasers	 over	 original	 owners	 by	 allowing	 them	 to	
acquire	a	 title	 free	 from	unknown	prior	claims,30	thus	 incentivising	the	acquisition	
of	 property.	 Thus,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 legal	 rules	 of	 some	Member	 States	may	
favour	static	security	over	dynamic	security,	even	if	the	EU	ETS	otherwise	functions	
properly,	it	would	not	function	optimally.	
It	would	be	far‐fetched	to	suggest	that	the	ambiguity	of	the	legal	nature	of	an	
EUA	 has	 encouraged	 some	 of	 the	 admittedly	 widespread	 illegal	 activity.	 Some	 of	
																																																								
29	René	Demogue,	‘Security’	in	A	Fouillée	et	al	(eds),	Modern	French	Legal	Philosophy	
(Franklin	W	 Scott	 and	 Joseph	 P	 Chamberlain	 tr,	 The	 Boston	 Book	 Co	 1916)	 418,	
428‐429.		
30	ibid,	427‐428.	
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such	 illegal	 activity	 can	 be	 curbed	 by	 technical,	 extra‐legal	 measures	 or	 the	
imposition	of	regulatory	safeguards	that	are	unrelated	to	the	legal	nature	of	an	EUA.	
Nor	is	it	the	case	that	a	clarification	of	the	EUA’s	legal	nature	will	ensure	the	success	
of	the	EU	ETS	by	reducing	carbon	emissions	since,	for	example,	an	over‐allocation	of	
EUAs	will	limit	the	effectiveness	of	the	scheme	no	matter	how	well	defined	the	legal	
nature	 of	 EUAs	 is.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 provide	 certainty	 to	 market	
participants	 as	 to	 their	 legal	 rights	 vis‐à‐vis	 other	 private	 persons	 since	 it	 is	
impossible	 to	 ensure	 that	 no	 illegal	 activity	 occurs.	 Failure	 to	 do	 so	 will	 cause	
market	participants,	many	of	whom	are	involuntary	participants,	to	incur	legal	costs	
to	 adjudicate	 upon	 their	 rights.	 These	 legal	 costs	 will	 inevitably	 be	 high	 because	
precious	relevant	guidance	will	be	available	to	the	parties	to	enable	them	to	predict	
the	 outcome	 of	 the	 litigation.	 This	 uncertainty	 will	 itself	 hinder	 the	 prospects	 of	
settlement.31	These	uncertainties	will	 likewise	discourage	 some	 from	participating	
in	the	carbon	market.	The	paucity	of	guidance	within	the	design	of	the	EU	ETS	also	
leaves	 national	 courts	 with	 an	 unenviable	 task.	 Courts	 are	 typically	 not	 ideally	
placed	to	determine	what	legal	rules	will	enhance	the	efficacy	of	trade	in	EUAs	so	as	
to	better	achieve	the	objectives	of	the	EU	ETS.	Nor,	even	if	they	are	able	to	do	so,	are	
they	necessarily	 in	a	position,	given	their	constitutional	role,	 to	do	so	 if	such	rules	
will	require	them	to	depart	 from	established	 legal	rules	within	their	national	 legal	
system.	
As	such,	whilst	 it	cannot	be	said	that	the	paucity	of	guidance	as	to	the	legal	
nature	 of	 EUAs	 contributed	 to	 the	 sort	 of	 carbon	 fraud	 seen	 in	 Armstrong	 v	
Winnington,	it	certainly	exacerbated	the	misfortune	of	both	parties	(who	may	fairly	
be	described	as	victims	of	the	fraud)	as	the	trial	took	on	an	unnecessarily	byzantine	
complexion.	While	the	trial	judge	no	doubt	correctly	determined	that,	at	least	for	the	
purposes	 of	 English	 common	 law,	 an	 EUA	 constitutes	 a	 ‘property	 right	 of	 some	
sort’,32	he	was	left	to	struggle	to	determine	what	private‐law	rights	were	conferred	
by	 this	 sort	 of	 ‘property’.	 A	 review	 of	 the	 decision	 would	 suggest	 that,	 owing	 to	
concessions	 made	 by	 the	 parties,	 certain	 possibly	 mistaken	 assumptions	 and	 a	
number	 of	 unexplored	 claims,	 Armstrong	v	Winnington	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 final	
word	on	the	subject	even	as	a	matter	of	English	 law.	It	 is	also	useful	to	remember	
that	 Armstrong	v	Winnington	purports	 to	 answer	 only	 one	 hypothetical	 question	
(Question	4(ii)	 above)	 according	 to	 the	 laws	 of	 one	Member	 State	 (England).	 The	
same	process	must	then	be	repeated	for	every	possible	claim	in	every	hypothetical	
scenario	 and	every	Member	State	within	 the	EU.	 It	must	 also	be	 stressed	 that	 the	
parties	in	Armstrong	v	Winnington	raised	no	conflict	of	laws	issues	even	though	it	is	
plausible	 given	 the	 foreign	 (German)	 origins	 of	 the	 EUAs,	 which	 would	 further	
complicate	a	dispute.	This	 should	afford	us	an	 idea	of	 the	 scale	of	 the	uncertainty	
market	participants	are	subject	to	within	the	EU	ETS.	
3.	ARMSTRONG	V	WINNINGTON	
																																																								
31	George	 L	 Priest	 and	 Benjamin	 Klein,	 ‘The	 Selection	 of	 Disputes	 for	 Litigation’	
(1984)	13	J	Legal	Stud	1,	13‐17.	
32	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[31].	
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In	 Armstrong	 v	Winnington,	 the	 claimant,	 Armstrong	 DLW	 GmbH,	 was	 a	
German	company	and	an	involuntary	participant	in	the	EU	ETS.	It	held	two	accounts	
with	the	German	registry,	one	for	each	of	the	power	plants	that	it	operated.	Through	
a	 ‘phishing’	 e‐mail	 fraud,	 a	 third	 party	 obtained	 access	 to	 one	 of	 Armstrong’s	
accounts,	 for	 its	Delmenhorst	plant,	which	contained	22,064	EUAs.	Separately,	 the	
defendant,	Winnington	Networks	Ltd,	a	 trader	of	EUAs	registered	with	 the	United	
Kingdom	registry,	was	contacted	by	a	Mr	Bhovinder	Singh,	purporting	 to	act	 for	a	
Dubai	based	company,	Zen	Holdings	Ltd,	with	a	view	to	trading	in	EUAs.	Eventually,	
Winnington	 agreed	 to	 purchase	 21,000	 EUAs	 from	 Zen	 for	 a	 price	 of	 €267,645.	
Payment	was	made	by	Winnington	after	Zen	caused	21,000	EUAs	to	be	transferred	
from	 Armstrong’s	 account	 to	 Winnington.	 At	 the	 time,	 Winnington	 was	 unaware	
that	 the	 account	 from	 which	 the	 EUAs	 it	 had	 ‘purchased’	 had	 been	 transferred	
belonged	 to	Armstrong.	Winnington	 immediately	 sold	 on	 the	21,000	EUAs	 to	 TFS	
Green	for	€271,266.25	after	it	received	the	same	‘from’	Zen.	
When	 the	 fraud	 was	 discovered,	 Armstrong	 brought	 a	 variety	 of	 claims	
against	Winnington	before	the	English	courts.	Initially,	according	to	the	trial	 judge,	
these	appeared	to	number	five:33	
(1) a	common	law	claim	on	the	basis	of	money	had	and	received;	
	
(2) a	claim	for	restitution	of	the	EUAs	based	on	unjust	enrichment;	
	
(3) a	claim	in	equity	on	the	basis	of	knowing	receipt	of	trust	property;	
	
(4) an	 equitable	 proprietary	 claim	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 Winnington	 held	 the	
EUAs	or	their	proceeds	on	constructive	trust;	and	
	
(5) some	form	of	tracing	claim	or	remedy.	
Eventually,	in	closing,	these	claims	were	narrowed	down	to	three:34	
(1) a	personal	claim	at	common	law	claim	to	vindicate	its	proprietary	rights	
in	the	EUAs	via	restitution;	
	
(2) a	personal	claim	at	common	law	for	restitution	of	 the	value	of	 the	EUAs	
on	the	basis	of	unjust	enrichment;	and	
	
(3) a	 personal	 claim	 in	 equity	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 knowing	 receipt	 of	 trust	
property.	
Armstrong	had	abandoned	 its	 claims	 for	proprietary	 relief	 in	 equity	by	 the	
																																																								
33	ibid	[23].	
34	ibid	[2].	
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close	 of	 trial.35	In	 its	 defence,	Winnington	 denied	 liability	 principally	 on	 the	 basis	
that	 it	 had	 no	 knowledge	 that	 the	 EUAs	 which	 it	 had	 purchased	 ‘from’	 Zen	 had	
actually	belonged	to	Armstrong.	 In	 legal	 terms,	 these	 translated	to	 the	defences	of	
bona	 fide	 purchase	 and	 change	 of	 position.	 While	 it	 initially	 further	 sought	 to	
counterclaim	 against	 Armstrong	 in	 negligence	 for	 its	 employee’s	 carelessness	 in	
responding	 to	 the	 ‘phishing’	 fraud,	 this	 was	 abandoned	 at	 the	 outset	 of	 closing	
submissions.36	
The	 trial	 judge	 described	 ‘the	 legal	 question	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 dispute	 as	
follows.	If	B	steals	A’s	property	and	sells	it	to	C,	does	A	have	a	claim	against	C	for	the	
property	or	its	value,	and	if	so,	what	is	the	legal	basis	of	A’s	claim	and	what	defences,	
if	 any,	 does	 C	 have	 to	 such	 a	 claim?’37	According	 to	 his	 Lordship,	 ‘[w]here	 the	
property	 in	question	 is	goods,	 the	matter	 is	covered	by	 the	 law	of	conversion	and	
the	 principles	 are	 relatively	 clear.	 However,	 where	 the	 property	 in	 question	 is	 a	
chose	 in	 action	 or	 some	 other	 intangible	 property,	 the	 position	 is	 less	 clear.’38	To	
describe	 the	 position	 as	 ‘less	 clear’	 is	 something	 of	 an	 understatement	 but	 the	
greater	 problem	 lies	 in	 his	 formulation	 of	 the	 legal	 question	 altogether.	Where	 B	
steals	 A’s	 goods	 and	 sells	 it	 to	 C,	 both	 B	 (in	 selling	 the	 goods)	 and	 C	 (in	 taking	
delivery	 of	 the	 goods)	 interfere	 with	 A’s	 (possessory)	 rights	 to	 the	 goods.	 These	
rights	 are	 property	 rights	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 are	 rights	 in	 rem	 to	 the	 goods,	
enforceable	 against	 the	 world	 at	 large.	 Where	 the	 same	 scenario	 is	 applied	 to	 a	
chose	in	action,	let	us	suppose	an	unsecured	debt	at	law,	two	extremely	significant	
differences	reveal	themselves	on	closer	examination.		
		First,	the	subject	matter	of	the	interference	by	both	B	and	C	is	not	an	in	rem	
right	but	an	 in	personam	right	that	A	holds	against	his	debtor,	D.	Whilst	a	chose	in	
action	 is	 often	 classified	 as	 a	 type	 of	 property,	 in	 so	 describing	 it,	 we	 are	 using	
‘property’	to	mean	something	quite	different	from	the	classical	in	rem	right.	A	right	
in	rem	is	 a	 right	 in	or	 against	 a	 thing	 yet	 there	doesn’t	 appear	 to	be	 any	 separate	
thing	 that	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 debt	 other	 than	 the	 debt	 itself.	 Furthermore,	 a	 right	
cannot	 both	 be	 in	 rem	 and	 in	 personam.	 An	 unsecured	 debt	 is	 unarguably	 in	
personam	in	nature.	A	classificatory	scheme	which	purports	to	distinguish	rights	in	
rem	 from	 rights	 in	personam	 but	 which	 then	 insists	 that	 rights	 in	personam	 are	
themselves	 in	rem	 rights	 is	 blatantly	 unsound.	 ‘Property’,	 as	 used	by	 lawyers,	 is	 a	
dangerously	slippery	word	and	uncharacteristic	of	a	profession	that	prides	itself	on	
precision.	 Birks	 famously	 distinguishes	 between	 the	 use	 of	 the	 label	 ‘property’	 to	
loosely	mean	 ‘wealth’	 (which	 can	 include	 in	personam	 rights)	 and	a	 stricter,	more	
technical	 usage	 of	 the	 word.39	According	 to	 Birks,	 in	 its	 more	 technical	 usage,	
property	 is	 distinguished	 from	obligations	 by	 a	 bright	 line,	 of	which	 the	 practical	
																																																								
35	ibid	[24].	
36	ibid	[25].	
37	ibid	[28].	
38	ibid	[29].	
39	Peter	Birks,	 ‘Before	We	Begin:	Five	Keys	 to	Land	Law’	 in	Susan	Bright	and	 John	
Dewar	(eds),	Land	Law:	Themes	and	Perspectives	(OUP	1998)	457,	473.	
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difference	is	borne	of	the	question,	 ‘Against	whom	is	the	right	exigible?’	 ‘A	right	 in	
rem	is	a	right	the	exigibility	of	which	is	defined	by	the	location	of	a	thing.	A	right	in	
personam	is	defined	by	the	location	of	the	person.’40	Perhaps	even	more	plainly,	it	is	
said	that	one	of	the	hallmarks	of	a	property	right	is	its	exigibility	against	strangers	
to	 its	 creation.41	On	 this	 view,	 many	 choses	 in	 action,	 such	 as	 debts,	 would	 not	
qualify	 as	 property	 at	 all.42	An	 even	 stricter	 view	 would	 require	 the	 universally	
exigible	 right	 to	 be	 separable	 from	 a	 physical	 thing,	 preventing	 even	 intellectual	
property	rights	from	qualifying	as	property.43		
It	 is	 however	 arguable	 that	 such	 a	 definition	 of	 property	 is	 excessively	
narrow.44	Rather	 than	being	 symptomatic	 of	 laxity,	 the	 broader	 label	 of	 ‘property’	
refers	 to	 the	 law’s	 recognition	 of	 and	 willingness	 to	 enforce	 a	 holder’s	 rights	 to	
exclude	 others	 from	 a	 resource, 45 	whether	 tangible	 or	 intangible,	 without	
necessarily	 providing	any	 clues	 as	 to	 its	 exigibility.	 After	 all,	 ‘the	word	 “property”	
reflects	 its	 semantically	 correct	 root	 by	 identifying	 the	 condition	 of	 a	 particular	
resource	as	being	“proper”	to	a	particular	person.’46	It	would	be	a	mistake	to	assume	
that	 rights	 to	 exclude	 others	 from	 a	 resource	 may	 only	 be	 granted	 by	 the	 law	
through	directly	enforceable	rights	against	an	indefinite	class	of	persons.	While	legal	
property	 rights	 to	 tangible	 things	 in	 common	 law	 systems	 take	 on	 this	 form,	 it	 is	
certainly	 not	 true	 of	 equitable	 property	 rights	 to	 tangible	 things,	which	 take	 on	 a	
different,	sometimes	indirect,	form.	Suppose	A	declares	that	he	holds	his	bicycle	on	
trust	for	B.	If	C	were	to	steal	the	bicycle	from	A,	the	law	does	not	permit	B	to	sue	C	
directly.47	Instead,	 B	 must	 sue	 A	 to	 direct	 him	 to	 sue	 C.	 B’s	 equitable	 ‘property’	
behaves	 differently	 from	 a	 legal	 property	 in	 the	 bicycle.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 right	 to	
exclude	 afforded	 by	 equity	 to	 B	 operates	 indirectly,	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 the	
trustee	A.	Where	 legal	 intangible	property	 is	 concerned,	 it	 is	 a	mistake	 to	 assume	
that	 a	 right	 confers	 a	 power	 to	 exclude	 only	 where	 it	 is	 enforceable	 against	 the	
																																																								
40	ibid.	
41	William	Swadling,	‘Property:	General	Principles’	in	Andrew	Burrows	(ed),	English	
Private	Law	(3rd	edn,	OUP	2013)	[4.03].	
42	ibid	[4.20].		
43	ibid	[4.20].	Contra	William	Swadling,	‘Property:	General	Principles’	in	Peter	Birks	
(ed),	English	Private	Law	Volume	I	(OUP	2000)	[4.52].	See	also	Ben	McFarlane,	The	
Structure	of	Property	Law	(Hart	Publishing	2008)	132‐137.	
44	Jim	Harris,	‘Property	–	Rights	in	Rem	or	Wealth?’	in	Peter	Birks	and	Arianna	Pretto	
(eds),	Themes	in	Comparative	Law:	In	Honour	of	Bernard	Rudden	(OUP	2002)	51.	
45	Felix	S	Cohen,	 ‘Dialogue	on	Private	Property’	(1954)	9	Rutgers	Law	Review	357,	
370‐371	
46	Kevin	Gray	and	Susan	Francis	Gray,	‘The	Idea	of	Property	in	Land’	in	Susan	Bright	
and	John	Dewar	(eds),	Land	Law:	Themes	and	Perspectives	(OUP	1998)	15,	15‐16.	
47	MCC	Proceeds	v	Shearson	Lehmann	[1998]	4	All	ER	675.	See	also	Leigh	and	Sullivan	
Ltd	v	Aliakmon	Shipping	Co	Ltd	(The	Aliakmon)	[1986]	AC	785.	Cf	Shell	UK	Ltd	v	Total	
UK	Ltd	[2010]	EWCA	Civ	180,	[2011]	QB	86,	noted	Kelvin	F	K	Low,	‘Equitable	Title	
and	Economic	Loss’	(2010)	126	LQR	507.	
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world	 at	 large,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 copyrights	 and	 patents.48	Exigibility	 is	
distinguishable	 from	exclusivity.	The	 law	of	property’s	 concern	over	 the	power	 to	
exclude,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 choses	 in	 action,	 lies	 in	 the	 law’s	 identification	 of	 the	
person	who	is	able	to	provide	relief	to	an	obligor	in	law	for	the	right	of	the	obligee.		
This	concern	is	the	same	whether	we	are	concerned	with	choses	in	action	that	are	in	
personam	(such	as	debts)	or	 in	rem	 (such	as	patents).	Suppose	A	is	the	holder	of	a	
patent	for	a	widget.	Suppose	then	that	B	pretends	to	be	A	and	‘licences’	the	patent	to	
C,	who	proceeds	to	manufacture	the	widget.	The	‘licence’	is	no	defence	to	an	action	
for	patent	infringement	brought	by	A	against	C.	This	is	because	the	law	of	property	
provides	that	only	A	is	able	to	release	C	from	his	duty	not	to	infringe	the	patent.	This	
pattern	 is	 exactly	 the	 same	 where	 the	 subject‐matter	 of	 the	 property	 is	 an	 in	
personam	chose	in	action.	Suppose	A	has	been	assigned	a	debt	owing	by	D.	Suppose	
then	 that	 B	 pretends	 to	 be	 A	 and	manages	 to	 convince	D	 to	 ‘pay’	 him.	 Short	 of	 a	
provision	to	the	contrary	in	the	underlying	contract,	the	‘payment’	by	D	to	B	would	
not	absolve	him	of	his	duty	to	pay	A	because	the	law	of	property	provides	that	only	
A	 may	 release	 him	 from	 his	 duty	 to	 make	 payment.	 Where	 there	 are	 multiple	
assignments,	 such	 as	 where	 the	 creditor	 first	 assigns	 to	 B	 and	 then	 purports	 to	
assign	the	same	debt	to	C,	the	law	of	property	tells	us	that	it	is	not	the	timing	of	the	
assignment	 but	 the	 timing	 of	 each	 assignee’s	 notification	 of	 the	 debtor	 D,	 that	
confers	priority	to	the	assignee.49	On	this	view,	the	law	of	property	does	not	tell	us	
the	content	of	the	right	(e.g.	not	to	copy,	not	to	manufacture,	to	make	payment)	nor	
its	exigibility	(e.g.	against	the	contracting	counterparty,	against	everyone	in	England	
and	Wales,	against	everyone	in	the	European	Union).	It	merely	tells	us	who	among	
various	 competing	 parties	 may	 legitimately	 control	 those	 rights,	 whatever	 their	
exigibility	and	content.	
The	preoccupation	with	equating	property	with	exigibility	 is	unhealthy.	On	
the	one	hand,	it	diminishes,	quite	literally,	the	law	of	property.	On	the	other,	it	leads	
to	 some	 dubious	 calls	 for	 the	 expansion	 of	 exigibility. 50 	At	 the	 risk	 of	
oversimplification,	some	scholars	argue	that	holders	of	in	personam	choses	in	action	
ought	to	be	able	to	sue	the	world	at	 large	 for	unwarranted	 ‘interferences’	because	
exigibility	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 property	 and	 a	 chose	 in	 action,	 even	 if	 in	personam,	 is	
property.	There	are	indeed	tort	actions	that	appear	to	protect	against	interferences	
with	 in	personam	choses	in	action.	The	economic	tort	of	inducement	of	a	breach	of	
contract	is	the	most	obvious	example.	However,	 in	personam	choses	in	action	were	
regarded	 as	 property	 well	 before51	the	 modern	 tort	 of	 inducement	 of	 breach	 of	
																																																								
48	Cf	Swadling	(n	43)	[4.52].	
49	The	rule	in	Dearle	v	Hall	(1828)	3	Russ	1.	
50	See,	 eg,	 Sarah	 Green	 and	 John	 Randall,	 The	Tort	of	Conversion	 (Hart	 Publishing	
2009),	 Lee	 Pey	 Woan,	 ‘Inducing	 Breach	 of	 Contract,	 Conversion	 and	 Contract	 as	
Property’	 (2009)	 29	 OJLS	 511.	 Contra	 Simon	 Douglas,	 Liability	 for	 Wrongful	
Interferences	with	Chattels	(Hart	Publishing	2011)	18,	Amy	Goymour,	‘Conversion	of	
Contractual	Rights’	[2011]	LMCLQ	67.		
51	See,	eg,	William	Blackstone,	Commentaries	on	the	Laws	of	England	Volume	2	Of	the	
Rights	of	Things	(Clarendon	Press	1765‐1769),	442.	
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contract	 evolved52	out	of	 the	 action	 for	 enticement	of	 a	 servant	 founded	upon	 the	
Statute	 of	 Labourers	 1349	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Lumley	v	Gye.53	Furthermore,	 the	 tort	 of	
inducement	 of	 breach	 of	 contract	 is	more	 appropriately	 regarded	 as	 a	 species	 of	
accessory	 liability54	than	 as	 a	 property	 tort.	 It	 shares	more	 genetic	material	 with	
joint	tortfeasance	than	conversion,	trespass	or	any	property	tort.	Accordingly,	it	can	
be	 seen	 that	 the	 appellation	 ‘property’	 does	 not	 carry	 with	 it	 any	 necessary	
indication	 of	 strict	 rights	 against	 third	 parties	 for	 interferences.	 It	 is	 of	 course	
possible	for	the	law	to	develop	such	rights,55	perhaps	by	further	evolving	the	tort	of	
inducement	of	breach	of	contract,	some	other	economic	tort	or	by	adapting	the	tort	
of	 conversion,	but	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 such	 a	development	 is	 neither	
necessary	nor	necessarily	desirable.56	
Secondly,	where	 the	subject	matter	of	 the	 theft	 is	goods,	what	 the	common	
law	protects	 is	A’s	right	 to	possess	the	same	and	the	 law	protects	against	physical	
interference.57	Whilst	 lawyers	 often	 contrast	 the	 in	rem	 nature	 of	 A’s	 right	 to	 the	
goods	 with	 in	personam	rights,	 they	 often	 fail	 to	 clarify	 what	 these	 in	rem	rights	
entail.	 There	 is	 no	 fixed	 immutable	 list	 of	 rights	 that	 attach	 to	 property.58	For	
example,	unlike	rights	to	land,	for	which	the	tort	of	private	nuisance	exists,	there	is	
generally	no	legal	protection	for	more	ephemeral	and	intangible	interferences	with	
the	use	of	goods.	Even	where	the	right	is	one	to	land,	the	law	affords	no	protection	
from	 visual	 trespass.59	Thus,	 to	 say	 that	 the	 law	 of	 ‘property’	 provides	 A	 with	
exclusive	rights	to	a	thing	barely	begins	to	tell	us	anything	of	value	for	it	does	not	
elucidate	 what	 those	 rights	 entail.	 The	 torts	 protecting	 property	 rights	 to	 goods	
principally	protect	rights	to	possession.	Thus,	if	B	creates	a	din	so	that	A	cannot	hear	
the	ringing	of	his	mobile	phone,	B	commits	no	tort	and	A	has	no	legal	claim	against	
him.	 Unlike	making	 noise,	 the	 act	 of	 theft	 necessarily	 interferes	 with	 A’s	 right	 to	
possession	of	goods.60	Hence,	the	legal	response	is	‘relatively	clear’.		
But,	 to	employ	 the	example	given	by	 the	 trial	 judge,	 suppose	B	purports	 to	
‘steal’	A’s	chose	in	action	(a	debt	claim	against	D)	and	‘sell’	it	to	C,	what	right	of	A’s	
																																																								
52	See,	generally,	Hazel	Carty,	An	Analysis	of	the	Economic	Torts	(2nd	edn	OUP	2010)	
Chap	3.	
53	[1853]	2	E&B	216.	
54	See,	 eg,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 tort	 in	 Paul	 S	 Davies,	 Accessory	 Liability	 (Hart	
Publishing	2015)	Chap	5.	
55	See,	eg,	the	differences	in	opinion	in	OBG	Ltd	v	Allen	[2007]	UKHL	21,	[2008]	1	AC	
1.	
56	Goymour	(n	50).	
57	Douglas	(n	50)	16‐18.	
58	Craig	 Rotherham,	 ‘Property	 and	 Justice’	 in	 Matthew	 H	 Kramer	 (ed),	 Rights,	
Wrongs	and	Responsibilities	(Palgrave	2001)	148.	
59	Victoria	Park	Racing	and	Recreation	Grounds	Co	Ltd	v	Taylor	(1937)	58	CLR	479.	
60	The	 only	 known	 instance	 of	 the	 tort	 of	 conversion	 not	 to	 involve	 physical	
interference	 is	 the	 case	 of	 a	 sale	 which	 would	 destroy	 the	 claimant’s	 title	 to	 the	
chattel:	Consolidated	Co	v	Curtis	&	Son	[1892]	1	QB	495,	498.	
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has	 either	 B	 or	 C	 interfered	with?	 The	 answer	 is	 surprisingly	 straightforward,	 at	
least	 so	 far	 as	 debts	 and	 contractual	 rights	 are	 concerned.	 None	 whatsoever.	 A’s	
right	was	always	to	claim	repayment	from	D	and	D	alone	and	the	purported	sale	by	
B	to	C	of	the	right	does	not	prevent	A	from	doing	so.	Let	us	suppose	that	C	manages	
to	convince	D	that	the	chose	in	action	had	been	properly	assigned	to	him	so	that	D	
makes	repayment	to	C	before	A	presses	for	payment.	Does	that	entitle	D	to	refuse	to	
repay	A?	The	answer	is	still	 ‘no’.	 	D’s	obligation	that	comprised	A’s	chose	in	action	
was	to	repay	A	so	that	his	mistaken	payment	to	C	does	not	entitle	him	to	refuse	to	
perform.	A	chose	in	action,	unlike	land	or	a	chose	in	possession,	is	enjoyed	through	
legal	action	(if	necessary).	No	‘theft’	can	in	and	of	itself	prevent	A	from	insisting	on	
his	 strict	 legal	 rights.	 Certain	 ‘interferences’	may	 leave	A	 in	 an	 awkward	 position	
where	 an	 insistence	 on	 his	 strict	 legal	 rights	 may	 be	 unwise	 from	 a	 personal	 or	
economic	 perspective	 because	 he	 wishes	 to	 maintain	 good	 relations	 with	 D.	
However,	English	common	law	does	not	generally	protect	one	from	having	to	make	
difficult	 choices.	 If	 we	 then	 turn	 our	 attention	 to	 EUAs,	 the	 right	 to	 emit,	 like	 an	
unsecured	debt,	is	not	universally	exigible.	It	is	designed	to	be	exigible	only	against	
Member	 States	 since	 it	 affords	 protection	 to	 the	 holder	 of	 an	 EUA	 from	 criminal	
liability	 against	 Member	 States	 from	 sanctions	 for	 failing	 to	 surrender	 sufficient	
EUAs.	It	affords	no	protection	from	sanctions	as	against	non‐Member	States.	Since	it	
is	 intangible,	 like	an	unsecured	debt	 claim,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 imagine	how	 it	may	be	
interfered	 with	 by	 an	 unauthorised	 sale,	 unless	 the	 law	 setting	 up	 the	 EU	 ETS	
enables	it.		
The	 obvious	 retort	 is	 that	 the	 EUAs	 once	 registered	 in	 Armstrong’s	 name	
were	no	longer	so	registered	but	this	reflects	both	a	failure	to	distinguish	between	a	
right	 and	 its	 record	 as	 well	 as	 the	 varying	 functions	 of	 registration	 systems.	
Registration	 systems	 serve	 as	 records	 of	 rights.	 They	 do	 not	 represent	 the	 rights	
themselves.	 It	 is	 thus	 not	 strictly	 accurate	 to	 state	 that	 ‘an	 EUA	 exists	 only	 in	
electronic	 form.’61	It	 is	 the	 inconclusive	 record	 that	 exists	 in	 electronic	 form.	 The	
EUA	itself	has	no	form	whatsoever.	Registers,	as	distinct	from	the	rights	they	record,	
are	heterogenous	and	 function	differently	depending	on	design.	Some	 registration	
systems	provide	prima	facie	evidence	of	title	such	as	the	case	of	shares,62	patents,63	
and	registered	designs.64	Some	registration	systems,	such	as	that	for	trade	marks,	do	
not	 purport	 to	 provide	 any	 indication	 as	 to	 title	 at	 all,	 whether	 prima	 facie	 or	
otherwise.65	At	the	other	extreme,	registration	of	a	fee	simple	title	to	land	provides	
far	greater	protection	than	prima	facie	evidence	of	title,	going	so	far	as	to	validate	an	
otherwise	 void	 transfer.	 Section	 58(1)	 of	 the	 English	 Land	 Registration	 Act	 2002	
provides:	 ‘If,	 on	 the	entry	of	 a	person	as	 the	proprietor	of	 a	 legal	 estate,	 the	 legal	
estate	would	not	otherwise	be	vested	in	him,	it	shall	be	deemed	to	be	vested	in	him	
as	a	result	of	the	registration.’	The	entry	of	a	notice	on	the	register	of	an	equitable	
																																																								
61	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[49].	
62	Section	127	Companies	Act	2006.	
63	Section	32(9)	Patents	Act	1977.	
64	Section	17(8)	Registered	Designs	Act	1949.	
65	Trade	Marks	Act	1994.	
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interest	 in	 land	 behaves	 differently	 again,	 providing	 priority	 without	 validating	
invalid	transfers.	Section	32(3)	of	the	English	Land	Registration	Act	2002	provides:	
‘The	fact	that	an	interest	is	the	subject	of	a	notice	does	not	necessarily	mean	that	the	
interest	is	valid,	but	does	mean	that	the	priority	of	the	interest,	if	valid,	is	protected	
for	 the	 purposes	 of	 sections	 29	 and	 30.’	With	 no	 provision	 being	made	 as	 to	 the	
protective	 effects,	 whether	 positive	 or	 negative,66	of	 registration	 of	 EUAs,	 it	 was	
always	 likely	 that	 the	 courts,	 at	 least	 in	 England	 and	 Wales,	 will	 decide	 that	
registration	following	an	unauthorised	transfer	is	ineffective	to	transfer	title.	Thus,	
it	 is	 unsurprising	 that	 in	 Armstrong	v	Winnington,	 the	 trial	 judge	 concludes	 that	
‘legal	title	remained,	at	all	relevant	times,	vested	in	Armstrong.’67	However,	if	this	is	
the	case,	then	surely	the	conclusion	ought	to	be	that,	as	a	matter	of	law,	there	was	no	
actionable	interference	with	Armstrong’s	EUAs	at	all.		
3.1	 THE	CASE	OF	THE	MISSING	DEFENDANT	
The	analogy	with	bank	operations	suggested	by	Carlarne68	provides	us	with	a	
helpful	starting	point,	especially	since	‘money’	held	in	a	bank	account	takes	the	form	
of	a	debt,	a	chose	in	action.	Even	if	the	court	in	Armstrong	v	Winnington	is	correct	in	
denying	 that	 an	 EUA	 is	 strictly	 speaking	 a	 chose	 in	 action,69	both	 EUAs	 and	 debts	
share	important	similarities.	They	are	both	intangible	property	with	limited,	rather	
than	universal,	exigibility.	A	debt	is	only	enforceable	against	the	debtor.	Likewise,	an	
EUA	only	protects	its	holder	from	fines	imposed	by	Member	States	participating	in	
the	EU	ETS.	There	is	a	further	helpful	similarity	between	EUAs	and	credit	balances	
in	 bank	 accounts.	 Statements	 of	 bank	 accounts	 are	 not	 generally	 regarded	 as	
conclusive.	Neither,	it	would	seem,	were	entries	in	registries	of	EUAs	at	the	time,	at	
least	if	we	take	Armstrong	v	Winnington’s	conclusion	that	Armstrong	retained	legal	
title	at	all	times.	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	register,	as	originally	conceived,	was	
simply	 a	 means	 of	 accounting	 for	 EUAs.70	It	 is	 instructive	 then	 to	 consider	 how	
																																																								
66	See	generally	McFarlane	(n	43)	83‐86.	
67	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[287].	
68	Carlarne	(n	17).	
69	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	 5)	 [48].	 It	 is	 suggested,	 contrary	 to	 the	 trial	 judge’s	
view,	that	a	chose	in	action	need	not	be	limited	to	a	Hohfeldian	right	but	may	also	
comprise	a	Hohfeldian	liberty.	A	chose	in	action	is	simply	a	right	enjoyed	by	way	of	
legal	action,	whether	 the	enjoyment	 takes	 the	 form	of	a	 claim	(right)	or	a	defence	
(liberty)	 to	 a	 claim.	 On	 the	 subject	 of	 Hohfeldian	 rights,	 see	 Wesley	 Newcomb	
Hohfeld,	 ‘Some	 Fundamental	 Legal	 Conceptions	 as	 Applied	 in	 Judicial	 Reasoning’	
(1913)	23	YLJ	16.	
70	Article	 19	 of	 the	 Directive	 provides:	 ‘Member	 States	 shall	 provide	 for	 the	
establishment	 and	 maintenance	 of	 a	 registry	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 the	 accurate	
accounting	of	the	issue,	holding,	transfer	and	cancellation	of	allowances.”	[Emphasis	
added.]	Article	4(3)	of	the	new	Regulations	provides:	“Member	States	shall	use	the	
Union	 Registry	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 meeting	 their	 obligations	 under	 Article	 19	 of	
Directive	 2003/87/EC	 and	Article	 11	 of	 Decision	No	 406/2009/EC	and	 to	 ensure	
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Armstrong	v	Winnington	 would	 have	 been	 decided	 had	 the	 case	 involved	 a	 credit	
balance	in	a	bank	account	rather	than	EUAs?	
In	 the	 first	place,	had	the	fraud	 involved	a	credit	balance	 in	a	bank	account	
rather	 than	 an	 EUA,	 Winnington	 is	 unlikely	 to	 have	 been	 sued	 as	 a	 defendant.	
Instead,	 Armstrong	 is	 likely	 to	 have	 either	 sued	 the	 German	 registry	 instead	 or	
simply	insisted	on	using	the	‘missing’	EUAs	for	its	own	compliance	purposes,	at	least	
if	German	law	was	the	same	as	English	 law.	This	 is	because,	 ‘[t]he	basic	answer	in	
English	 law	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 fraud,	 the	 customer	 is	 not	 precluded	by	 the	
bank	statement	or	the	pass‐book	from	disputing	an	error	or	an	incorrect	debit	made	
by	 the	 bank	 or	 from	 insisting	 on	 its	 correction.’71	Since	 the	 register,	 like	 a	 bank	
statement,	is	not	legally	conclusive,	upon	proof	that	the	transfer	was	unauthorised,	
Armstrong	ought	to	be	able	to	insist	upon	its	rectification	or	deliver	up	the	‘missing’	
EUAs	for	its	compliance	purposes	since	it	remained	their	legal	owner.	
However,	 the	 analogy	 to	 a	 bank	 account	 cannot	 be	 carried	 too	 far.	 The	
transfer	 of	 money	 between	 bank	 accounts	 differs	 significantly	 from	 a	 normal	
conception	 of	 a	 transfer	 of	 property,	 such	 as	 occurs	 with	 a	 transfer	 of	 corporeal	
money.	‘The	first	and	most	obvious	difference	from	a	transfer	of	corporeal	money	is	
that	 the	beneficiary	does	not	obtain	 the	 same	asset	 as	previously	belonged	 to	 the	
originator.	 It	 is	 not	 like	 a	 transfer	 of	 the	 very	 same	 coins	 or	 banknotes	 from	 the	
payor	 to	 the	 recipient,	 as	 happens	when	 a	 person	 pays	 corporeal	money.’72	Thus,	
‘[t]he	 explanation	 of	 how	 property	 in	 incorporeal	 money	 is	 transferred	 has	 very	
little	 to	 do	with	 the	 law	 governing	 the	 transfer	 of	 chattels	 by	 delivery.	 Far	more	
relevant	are	the	principles	of	the	law	of	contract	and	agency,	and	the	enforcement	of	
title	to	choses	in	action.’73	In	truth,	there	is	no	‘transfer’	as	traditionally	understood	
in	the	law	of	property:	
The	 chose	 in	 action	 representing	 the	 money	 transferred	 to	 the	 recipient’s	
bank	 account	 is	 a	 distinct	 item	 of	 property	 from	 the	 chose	 in	 action	
representing	 the	 funds	 which	 were	 originally	 in	 the	 payer’s	 account.	 The	
payer’s	title	to	the	money	is	not	strictly	transferred.	 Instead,	the	title	to	the	
value	represented	in	the	transfer	passes	to	the	recipient	because	the	payer’s	
bank	extinguishes	(wholly	or	partially)	the	debt	which	it	owes	the	payer,	and	
the	recipient’s	bank	creates	a	new	debt	owed	by	itself	to	the	recipient.74	
In	 the	 transaction,	both	 the	payer’s	bank75	and	 the	 recipient’s	bank76	act	 as	
																																																																																																																																																																					
accurate	 accounting	 of	 allowances,	 AEAs	 and	 to	 the	 credit	 entitlement	within	 the	
scope	of	this	Regulation.’	[Emphasis	added.]	
71	E	P	Ellinger,	E	Lomnicka	and	C	V	M	Hare,	Ellinger’s	Modern	Banking	Law	(5th	edn	
OUP	2011)	236.	
72	David	Fox,	Property	Rights	in	Money	(OUP	2008)	[5.25].	
73	ibid	[5.03].	
74	ibid	[5.05].	
75	Ellinger,	Lomnicka	and	Hare	(n	71)	610.	
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their	respective	customers’	agents.	
This,	 however,	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 how	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	 conceived	 of	
operating.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 does	 not	 conceive	 of	 registries	 extinguishing	 and	 creating	
fresh	 EUAs	 with	 every	 ‘transfer’.	 Article	 19	 of	 the	 Directive	 in	 its	 original	 form	
conceived	of	‘the	issue,	holding,	transfer	and	cancellation	of	allowances.’	[Emphasis	
added.]	There	is	also	no	need	to	do	so.	Credit	balances	in	bank	accounts	represent	
contractual	debts	owed	by	banks	to	their	customers.77	It	is	impossible	to	substitute	
either	 the	debtor	or	 the	 creditor	 (or	both	 in	 the	 case	of	many	 ‘transfers’)	without	
offending	the	doctrine	of	privity	in	the	law	of	contract.78	As	a	right	that	was	created	
with	 the	 express	 intent	 that	 it	would	 be	 transferable,	 there	 is	 no	 equivalent	 legal	
impediment	to	a	more	straightforward	understanding	of	how	EUAs	are	transferred.	
Nor	do	either	the	transferring	or	receiving	registry	act	as	agents	to	the	transferor	or	
the	recipient.	The	trial	judge	was	accordingly	correct	to	reject	the	argument	initially	
raised	 by	 Armstrong	 ‘that	 the	 EUAs	 which	 were	 received	 by	 Winnington	 on	 28	
January	2010	 into	 its	 registry	 account	were	different	 EUAs	 from	 those	which	had	
been	 lodged	 in	 Armstrong’s	 account’.79	Nevertheless,	 the	 basic	 premise	 that	
Armstrong’s	 rights	 to	 the	 EUAs	 remained	 unaffected	 holds.	 Thus,	 unlike	 modern	
land	registration	systems,	the	older	system	of	registration	of	deeds	that	was	applied	
to	 Yorkshire80	and	Middlesex,81	which	 like	 the	 EU	ETS	 did	 not	 purport	 to	 validate	
otherwise	 void	 transfers,	 provided	 no	 rights	 to	 recipients	 who	 register	 void	
instruments,	whether	 because	 of	 forgery82	or	 fraud.83	The	main	 complication	with	
this	 analysis	 is	 that	 the	 Directive	 implementing	 the	 EU	 ETS	 made	 no	 provision	
whatsoever	for	the	rectification	of	the	register	following	void	transfers	even	though	
registration	 under	 the	 Directive	 provided	 no	 benefits	 whatsoever	 in	 terms	 of	
securing	 title,	whether	prima	 facie	or	conclusive.	This	 lacuna	 in	 the	Directive	may	
explain	 why	 Armstrong	 did	 not	 bring	 an	 action	 seeking	 the	 rectification	 of	 the	
German	registry.	
3.2	 THE	CLAIM	IN	EQUITY	
Whatever	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 litigation	 taking	 shape	 in	 the	 way	 that	 it	
eventually	did,	the	absence	of	the	most	obvious	party	to	the	suit	left	the	trial	judge	
in	the	most	difficult	of	positions.	Having	effectively	concluded	that	the	nemo	dat	rule	
																																																																																																																																																																					
76	Ellinger,	 Lomnicka	 and	 Hare	 (n	 71)	 625.	 Contra	 Richard	 King,	 ‘The	 Receiving	
Bank’s	Role	in	Credit	Transfer	Transactions’	(1982)	45	MLR	369.	Cf	Benjamin	Geva,	
Bank	Collections	and	Payment	Transactions	(OUP	2001)	296.	
77	Foley	v	Hill	(1848)	2	HLC	28.	
78	See	 generally	 Hugh	 Beale	 (ed),	Chitty	on	Contracts	 (31st	 edn,	 Sweet	 &	Maxwell	
2012)	Chap	18.	
79	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[67].	
80	Yorkshire	(West	Riding)	Land	Registry	Act	1703	(2	&	3	Ann	c	4)	
81	Middlesex	Registry	Act	1708	(7	Ann	c	20)	
82	Re	Cooper	(1882)	20	Ch	D	611.	
83	Sutherland	v	Peel	(1864)	1	WW	&	A’B	18	
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applied	 so	 that	 Armstrong	 retained	 legal	 title	 to	 the	 EUAs,	 and	 not	 being	 in	 a	
position	 to	give	effect	 to	 this	 legal	 title	 to	 intangible	property	 in	 the	most	obvious	
way	(through	a	rectification	of	the	register),	the	trial	judge	struggled	to	give	effect	to	
Armstrong’s	property	right.		
Armstrong	asserted	three	different	claims	by	the	close	of	trial,	two	of	which	
were	 ‘proprietary’.	 One	 claim	 was	 premised	 upon	 the	 extremely	 controversial	
notion	that	there	existed	in	English	law	a	proprietary	restitutionary	claim.	The	other	
was	 premised	upon	 the	more	well‐established	 equitable	 claim	 for	unconscionable	
receipt	of	trust	property,	but	which	depended	upon	a	finding	of	separation	of	legal	
and	 equitable	 title	 that	 was	 not	 immediately	 apparent	 on	 the	 facts.	 Whereas	
normally	 a	 claimant,	 offered	 a	 choice	 between	 a	 legal	 proprietary	 claim	 and	 an	
equitable	proprietary	claim,	would	prefer	the	former	to	the	latter,	because	equitable	
property	is	generally	susceptible	to	being	overreached	by	a	bona	fide	purchaser	of	
the	legal	title	for	value	without	notice,84	the	trial	judge	appears	to	have	preferred	to	
resolve	Armstrong’s	claim	in	its	favour	via	the	equitable	route.85	
According	to	the	trial	judge,	‘[t]he	starting	point	is	to	determine	whether,	on	
the	 facts,	 by	 the	 time	 that	 the	EUAs	were	 received	by	Winnington	 at	 11.30	on	28	
January	2010,	legal	and	equitable	title	to	the	EUAs	had	become	separate,	or	rather,	
legal	 title	 (as	 well	 as	 beneficial	 ownership)	 remained	 with	 Armstrong.’86	His	
Lordship	found	that,	‘[s]ome	time	between	07.45	and	11.30	on	28	January	2010,	the	
third	 party	 fraudster	 gained	 de	 facto	 ministerial	 control	 over	 the	 EUAs	 lying	 in	
Armstrong’s	account.’87	This	gave	the	fraudster	‘some	form	of	de	facto	legal	title’	but	
that,	apparently	following	Westdeutsche	Landesbank	Girozentrale	v	Islington	London	
Borough	 Council,88	it	 ‘did	 not	 deprive	 Armstrong	 of	 its	 beneficial	 entitlement	 to	
those	EUAs’.89	This	sufficed	to	allow	Armstrong	to	pursue	its	claim	that	Winnington	
had	 been	 in	 unconscionable	 receipt	 of	 trust	 property.	 Having	 concluded	 that	 the	
EUAs	 received	 by	Winnington	 were	 the	 same	 EUAs	 as	 those	 ‘lost’	 by	 Armstrong	
rather	 than	 merely	 their	 traceable	 product,90	the	 only	 question	 was	 whether	
Winnington’s	knowledge	at	the	relevant	time	was	sufficiently	‘unconscionable’.	The	
trial	judge	concluded	that	it	did,	principally	because	it	had	requested	information	to	
confirm	that	the	party	it	was	dealing	with,	Zen,	either	owned	or	was	authorised	to	
transfer	the	EUAs	in	question	but	proceeded	with	the	transaction	without	receiving	
																																																								
84	David	Hayton,	Paul	Matthews	and	Charles	Mitchell,	Underhill	and	Hayton:	Law	of	
Trusts	and	Trustees	(18th	edn,	LexisNexis	2010)	[2.6].	See	also	Philip	H	Petit,	Equity	
and	the	Law	of	Trusts	 (12th	edn,	OUP	2012)	84‐86,	Graham	Virgo,	The	Principles	of	
Equity	&	Trusts	(OUP	2012)	50‐51.	
85	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[273]‐[289].		
86	ibid	[273].	
87	ibid.	
88	[1996]	AC	669,	716	per	Lord	Browne‐Wilkinson.	
89	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[276].	
90	ibid	[67]	
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a	 satisfactory	 reply.91	The	 questions	 were	 raised	 following	 Winnington’s	 own	
internal	due	diligence	procedures	 (known	as	 ‘know	your	client’	or	 ‘KYC’	 in	 short).	
This	met	the	 threshold	 for	establishing	 liability	 for	unconscionable	receipt	of	 trust	
property	because	it	constituted	knowledge	within	the	band	of	either	type	(2)	or	type	
(3)	on	the	Baden	 scale.	The	Baden	 scale	of	knowledge	refers	to	the	controversial92	
system	of	classification	of	knowledge	by	Peter	Gibson	J	 in	Baden	v	Société	Générale	
pour	Favoriser	le	Développement	du	Commerce	et	de	l’Industrie	en	France	SA	(Note).93	
They	are,	in	decreasing	order	of	blameworthiness:	
(1) actual	knowledge;	
	
(2) wilfully	shutting	one’s	eyes	to	the	obvious;	
	
(3) wilfully	 and	 recklessly	 failing	 to	make	 such	 inquiries	 as	 an	 honest	 and	
reasonable	man	would	make;	
	
(4) knowledge	of	circumstances	which	would	indicate	the	facts	to	an	honest	
and	reasonable	man;	and	
	
(5) knowledge	of	circumstances	which	would	put	an	honest	and	reasonable	
man	on	inquiry.	
This	 analysis	 of	 the	 claim	 in	 equity	 raises	 a	 number	 of	 difficulties.	 First,	 it	
appears	 to	 contemplate	 the	 existence	 of	 relative	 title	 at	 law	 to	 pure	 intangible	
property,	something	previously	unheard	of.	Thus,	to	the	question	‘at	common	law	is	
it	possible	to	create	relative	titles	to	intangible	property?’,	 it	has	been	posited	that	
‘[i]n	principle,	it	seems	that	this	is	not	possible,	at	least	where	the	title	arises	from	a	
right	of	ownership.	There	can	be	only	one	valid	right	of	legal	ownership	to	a	chose	in	
action.’94	In	common	law	systems,	relative	title	to	property	can	arise	either	through	
the	acts	of	an	interloper	or	as	a	result	of	a	series	of	derivative	transfers	of	legal	title.	
The	classic	example	of	the	former	is	the	squatter	of	land.	The	latter	typically	arises	
following	multiple	 assignments	 of	 the	 same	 property.	 The	 former	 is	 limited	 in	 its	
application	to	tangible	property	because	it	arises	by	the	act	of	taking	of	possession	
																																																								
91	ibid	[279]‐[281].	
92	See,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 claim	 in	 question,	 Bank	 of	 Credit	 and	
Commerce	International	(Overseas)	Ltd	v	Akindele	[2001]	Ch	437,	at	455	per	Nourse	
LJ:	‘A	test	in	that	form,	though	it	cannot,	any	more	than	any	other,	avoid	difficulties	
of	 application,	 ought	 to	 avoid	 those	 of	 definition	 and	 allocation	 to	 which	 the	
previous	categorisations	have	led.’	The	Baden	 scale	has	been	decisively	rejected	in	
the	 context	of	 claims	 for	dishonest	 assistance.	Thus,	 according	 to	Lord	Nicholls	 in	
Royal	Brunei	Airlines	Sdn	Bhd	v	Tan	 [1995]	2	AC	378,	at	392:	 ‘“Knowingly”	 is	better	
avoided	as	a	defining	ingredient	of	the	principle,	and	in	the	context	of	this	principle	
the	Baden	[1993]	1	WLR	509	scale	of	knowledge	is	best	forgotten.’	
93	[1993]	1	WLR	509,	575‐576.	
94	David	Fox,	‘Relativity	of	Title	at	Law	and	in	Equity’	(2006)	65	CLJ	330,	361.	
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and	 ‘[a]	 pure	 intangible	 …	 is	 incapable	 of	 being	 possessed.	 This	 method	 of	
generating	a	relative	title	 in	tangible	assets	simply	cannot	apply	to	such	a	chose	in	
action.	 The	 title	 is	 in	 the	 person	 with	 the	 right	 to	 sue	 on	 the	 claim.	 The	 right	 is	
necessarily	unitary.’	 Furthermore,	 one	of	 the	 features	of	 relativity	of	 title	 is	 that	a	
defendant	who	is	sued	for	interfering	with	the	property,	for	example,	in	conversion,	
is	 generally	 not	 permitted	 to	 plead	 the	 jus	tertii	of	 the	 true	 owner	 of	 the	 thing.95	
However,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 how	 this	 rule	 is	 adaptable	 to	 the	 context	 of	 intangible	
property.	Does	 it	mean	that	an	obligor	cannot	resist	enforcement	of	 the	 intangible	
property	by	the	holder	of	the	weaker,	relative,	title?	This	does	not	appear	to	be	the	
case	in	respect	of	intellectual	property	rights.96		
Secondly,	even	if	it	were	possible	for	Zen	to	acquire	a	relative	legal	title	to	the	
EUAs	 by	 gaining	 control	 of	 Armstrong’s	 account,	 there	 is	 still	 the	 further	 difficult	
question	of	how	Armstrong	acquired	an	equitable	title	to	the	EUAs	so	as	to	found	its	
claim	 in	unconscionable	 receipt	of	 trust	property	 as	against	Winnington.	The	 trial	
judge	 is	 on	 surer	 ground	 in	 clearing	 this	 second	 obstacle	 to	 Armstrong’s	 claim	 in	
equity.	 By	 way	 of	 obiter,	 Lord	 Browne‐Wilkinson	 in	 Westdeutsche	 Landesbank	
Girozentrale	v	Islington	London	Borough	Council	opined:97	
The	argument	for	a	resulting	trust	was	said	to	be	supported	by	the	case	of	a	
thief	who	steals	a	bag	of	coins.	At	 law	those	coins	remain	 traceable	only	so	
long	as	they	are	kept	separate:	as	soon	as	they	are	mixed	with	other	coins	or	
paid	into	a	mixed	bank	account	they	cease	to	be	traceable	at	law.	Can	it	really	
be	 the	 case,	 it	 is	 asked,	 that	 in	 such	 circumstances	 the	 thief	 cannot	 be	
required	 to	 disgorge	 the	 property	 which,	 in	 equity,	 represents	 the	 stolen	
coins?	Moneys	can	only	be	traced	in	equity	if	there	has	at	some	stage	been	a	
breach	of	 fiduciary	duty,	 ie	 if	either	before	the	 theft	 there	was	an	equitable	
proprietary	interest	(eg	the	coins	were	stolen	trust	moneys)	or	such	interest	
arises	 under	 a	 resulting	 trust	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 theft	 or	 the	mixing	 of	 the	
moneys.	Therefore,	it	is	said,	a	resulting	trust	must	arise	either	at	the	time	of	
the	theft	or	when	the	moneys	are	subsequently	mixed.	Unless	this	is	the	law,	
there	will	be	no	right	 to	recover	 the	assets	representing	 the	stolen	moneys	
once	the	moneys	have	become	mixed.	
																																																								
95	The	 case	 of	 Costello	v	Chief	Constable	of	Derbyshire	Constabulary	 [2001]	 1	WLR	
1437	 is	 the	most	 flagrant	 example	of	 this	 rule.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	plaintiff,	who	had	
been	 in	possession	of	a	stolen	car,	successfully	sued	the	police	 in	conversion	after	
their	 authority	 (derived	 from	 statute)	 to	 detain	 the	 car.	Cf	 Section	 8	 of	 the	 Torts	
(Interference	with	Goods)	Act	1977.	
96	Thus,	 according	 to	Neuberger	 J	 (as	he	 then	was)	 in	Farmer	v	Moseley	(Holdings)	
Ltd	(t/a	RTK	Marine)	[2000]	EWHC	Patents	128,	[45]:	‘it	does	appear	to	me	that	…	in	
an	action	for	infringement	of	an	intellectual	property	right,	it	is	for	the	claimant	to	
establish	that,	on	the	balance	of	probabilities,	he	 is	 the	proprietor	of	 that	right.’	Cf	
Rhone‐Poulenc	Rorer	International	Holdings	Inc	v	Yeda	Research	and	Development	Co	
Ltd	[2006]	RPC	24,	618.	
97	[1996]	AC	669,	715‐716.	
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I	 agree	 that	 stolen	 moneys	 are	 traceable	 in	 equity.	 But	 the	 proprietary	
interest	 which	 equity	 is	 enforcing	 in	 such	 circumstances	 arises	 under	 a	
constructive,	 not	 a	 resulting	 trust.	 Although	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 clear	
authority	 for	 the	 proposition,	 when	 property	 is	 obtained	 by	 fraud,	 equity	
imposes	 a	 constructive	 trust	 on	 the	 fraudulent	 recipient:	 the	 property	 s	
recoverable	and	traceable	in	equity.	
However,	 despite	 its	 apparent	 pedigree,	 this	 line	 of	 reasoning	 remains	
fraught	 with	 controversy.	 Thus,	 in	 Shalson	v	Russo,	 Rimer	 J	 commented	 on	 Lord	
Browne‐Wilkinson’s	obiter	remarks	in	Westdeutsche	in	the	following	terms:98	
I	do	not	find	that	an	easy	passage.	As	to	the	first	paragraph,	a	thief	ordinarily	
acquires	no	property	in	what	he	steals	and	cannot	give	a	title	to	it	even	to	a	
good	 faith	 purchaser:	 both	 the	 thief	 and	 the	 purchaser	 are	 vulnerable	 to	
claims	by	the	true	owner	to	recover	his	property.	 If	 the	 thief	has	no	title	 in	
the	 property,	 I	 cannot	 see	 how	 he	 can	 become	 a	 trustee	 of	 it	 for	 the	 true	
owner:	 the	 owner	 retains	 the	 legal	 and	 beneficial	 title.	 If	 the	 thief	 mixes	
stolen	money	with	other	money	in	a	bank	account,	the	common	law	cannot	
trace	into	it.	…	
As	 to	 Lord	 Browne‐Wilkinson's	 more	 general	 proposition	 in	 the	 second	
paragraph	 that	 property	 obtained	 by	 fraud	 is	 automatically	 held	 by	 the	
recipient	 on	 a	 constructive	 trust	 for	 the	 person	 defrauded,	 I	 respectfully	
regard	 the	 authorities	he	 cites	 as	providing	 less	 than	 full	 support	 for	 it.	 At	
any	 rate,	 they	 do	 not	 in	 my	 view	 support	 the	 proposition	 that	 property	
transferred	 under	 a	 voidable	 contract	 induced	 by	 fraud	 will	 immediately	
(and	prior	to	any	rescission)	be	held	on	trust	for	the	transferor.	
Lord	 Browne‐Wilkinson’s	 obiter	 remarks	 have	 been	 defended	 on	 the	 basis	
that	its	critics	have	misunderstood	the	subject‐matter	of	the	constructive	trust.	The	
trust,	it	is	said,	arises	over	the	thief’s	relative	possessory	title	rather	than	that	of	the	
true	owner.	 ‘There	 is	no	absolute	reason	why	that	possessory	 legal	title	cannot	be	
held	on	trust.	…	Properly	understood,	the	subject‐matter	of	the	constructive	trust	in	
favour	of	 the	 victim	of	 the	 theft	 is	 the	 thief’s	 possessory	 title	 to	 the	 stolen	money	
rather	than	the	victim’s	retained,	and	superior,	interest	as	legal	owner.’99	Obviously,	
this	view	of	Lord	Browne‐Wilkinson’s	obiter	would	not	be	applicable	in	Armstrong	v	
Winnington	for	the	obvious	reason	that	it	is	impossible	to	establish	a	relative	title	to	
a	pure	intangible.	But	even	if	we	are	to	ignore	this	objection,	difficulties	remain.	It	is	
clear	that	Lord	Browne‐Wilkinson	contemplates	the	imposition	of	this	constructive	
trust	for	the	purposes	of	allowing	a	victim	of	theft	to	employ	equity’s	more	generous	
rules	of	tracing,	a	process	by	which	common	law	systems	permit	rights	to	particular	
things	to	be	effectively	transmitted	to	their	substitutes.	Yet,	the	claim	as	permitted	
																																																								
98	[2005]	Ch	281,	[110]‐[111].	See	also	A	J	Oakley,	Parker	and	Mellows:	The	Modern	
Law	of	Trusts	(9th	edn,	Sweet	&	Maxwell	2008)	446.	
99	Fox	(n	72)	143.	
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by	the	trial	judge	eschews	the	need	for	any	tracing	whatsoever.100	
Finally,	the	characterisation	of	Winnington’s	knowledge	at	the	relevant	time	
as	 unconscionable	 may	 be	 open	 to	 challenge.	 This	 characterisation	 stemmed	
primarily	 from	Winnington’s	 failure	 to	 receive	 a	 satisfactory	 response	 to	 the	KYC	
questions	that	 it	had	posed	to	 its	counterparty,	Zen.	Winnington	sought	 to	explain	
its	 failure	 to	press	 for	answers	on	 the	basis	 that	 it	had	 ‘believed	 that	ETS	registry	
accounts	were	secure	and	that	only	an	authorised	person	could	transfer	allowances	
and	 thus	 that	 the	 fact	of	 transfer	was	sufficient	proof	of	ownership.	This	was	why	
they	did	not	need	the	KYC	information	to	prove	ownership.’101	While	the	trial	judge	
accepted	 ‘that	 there	 is	a	certain	 logic	 in	the	proposition’,	 this	was	 insufficient	as	 it	
did	not	establish	that	Winnington	believed	that	‘the	registry	accounts	were	entirely	
secure,	and,	further	and	more	importantly,	that	they	did	not	believe,	or	work	on	the	
assumption,	 that	mere	 transfer	 of	 EUAs	was	 sufficient	 to	 prove	 ownership	 of	 the	
EUAs.’102	Winnington’s	case	that	‘the	fact	of	transfer	before	payment	…	abrogated	the	
need	 for	 the	KYC	 information	 relating	 to	 registry	 account	details’	was	 rejected	by	
the	trial	judge	on	the	basis	that	‘[i]f	mere	transfer	does	prove	ownership,	it	does	so	
whenever	 the	 transfer	 takes	 place	 –	 whether	 before	 or	 after	 payment.’103	The	
difficulty	with	 this	 reasoning	 is	 that	 it	 involves	 a	misconstruction	of	Winnington’s	
case	 altogether.	 In	 any	 trade,	 unless	 the	 circumstances	 arouse	 suspicions,	 the	
foremost	risk	in	the	minds	of	a	trader	is	counterparty	risk,	not	fraud.	Winnington’s	
case	 fits	perfectly	 the	oft‐cited	words	of	Bowen	LJ	 in	Sanders	Brothers	v	Maclean	&	
Co:104	
But	the	practice	of	merchants,	it	is	never	superfluous	to	remark,	is	not	based	
on	 the	 supposition	of	possible	 frauds.	The	object	of	mercantile	usages	 is	 to	
prevent	 the	 risk	 of	 insolvency,	 not	 of	 fraud;	 and	 any	 one	who	 attempts	 to	
follow	 and	 understand	 the	 law	 merchant	 will	 soon	 find	 himself	 lost	 if	 he	
begins	 by	 assuming	 that	merchants	 conduct	 their	 business	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
attempting	 to	 insure	themselves	against	 fraudulent	dealing.	The	contrary	 is	
the	case.	Credit,	not	distrust,	is	the	basis	of	commercial	dealings;	mercantile	
genius	consists	principally	in	knowing	whom	to	trust	and	with	whom	to	deal,	
and	 commercial	 intercourse	 and	 communication	 is	 no	 more	 based	 on	 the	
supposition	of	fraud	than	it	is	on	the	supposition	of	forgery.	
																																																								
100	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[65]‐[67].	
101	ibid	[226].	
102	ibid	[227].	
103	ibid	[233].	
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Winnington,	as	a	 trader	 in	allowances,	was	 concerned	primarily	 that	 it	will	
receive	the	allowances	that	it	purchases.	There	was	no	cause	to	suspect	fraud	at	the	
outset.	 If	 the	 counterparty	 is	 prepared	 to,	 as	 Zen	 was	 on	 the	 facts,	 transfer	 the	
allowances	 before	 it	 had	 to	 make	 payment,	 then	 Winnington’s	 concerns	 as	 to	
counterparty	 risk	 obviously	 dissipates.	 If,	 however,	 payment	 is	 agreed	 to	 precede	
transfer	or	if	they	are	agreed	to	be	concurrent	obligations,	 then	the	KYC	questions	
will	serve	to	alleviate	Winnington’s	concerns	as	to	Zen’s	ability	to	transfer	the	EUAs	
agreed	upon.	The	questions	were	posed	to	Zen	at	the	outset	because	it	was	not	clear	
on	what	 basis	 the	 trade	was	 supposed	 to	 proceed.	 They	were	 superseded	once	 it	
was	clear	 that	Zen	was	prepared	to	 transfer	 the	allowances	before	payment.	Thus,	
whilst	Bowen	LJ’s	advice	had	been	cited,105	it	does	not	appear	to	have	been	heeded.	
Whilst	 it	 is	 therefore	 true	 that	 ‘[i]nsisting	 on	 transfer	 before	 (rather	 than	 after)	
payment	 guards	 against	 the	 risk	 of	 non‐performance	 (i	 e	 non‐delivery)	 and	 not	
against	the	risk	that	the	transferor	does	not	have	title	or	authority’,106	the	trial	judge	
offers	no	reasons	apart	from	the	unanswered	KYC	questions	why	Winnington	ought	
to	have	been	on	guard	as	against	Zen	as	to	possible	fraud	in	the	first	place.	It	may	
perhaps	be	desirable	for	the	workings	of	the	carbon	market	that	Bowen	LJ’s	words	
are	disregarded	but	if	so,	one	should	expect	an	accounting	of	why	this	is	the	case.	
3.3	 THE	CLAIMS	AT	COMMON	LAW	
Armstrong	 raised	 two	 claims	 at	 common	 law.	 First,	 a	 common	 law	
proprietary	 restitutionary	 claim.	 Secondly,	 a	 common	 law	 claim	 in	 restitution	 for	
unjust	enrichment.	Both	claims	were	rooted	 in	 the	profoundly	difficult	decision	of	
Lipkin	Gorman	v	Karpnale	Ltd107	by	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 and	 represented	 differing	
interpretations	 of	 that	 abstruse	 decision	 as	 well	 as	 its	 progeny.	 It	 is	 hence	
instructive	to	examine	Lipkin	Gorman	briefly	before	an	analysis	of	its	application	in	
Armstrong	 v	Winnington	 is	 attempted.	 In	 Lipkin	 Gorman,	 the	 rogue	 Cass	 was	 a	
partner	 in	 the	plaintiff	 firm	of	 solicitors.	 In	order	 to	 feed	his	gambling	habit,	Cass	
withdrew	a	 sum	of	money	 from	 the	 firm’s	 client	 account	 at	 Lloyd’s	 Bank	without	
authority.	 Cass	 lost	 most	 of	 that	 money	 at	 the	 Playboy	 Club	 operated	 by	 the	
defendant.	The	plaintiff’s	claim	against	the	defendant	succeeded.	The	precise	basis	
of	 the	 claim	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 intense	 dispute	 but	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 make	 two	
uncontroversial	observations	of	the	decision.	First,	 legal	title	 to	the	cash	passed	to	
Cass	 and	 not	 the	 plaintiff	 firm	 upon	 withdrawal.108	Secondly,	 a	 central	 plank	
enabling	the	plaintiff	 to	succeed	in	their	claim	rested	on	their	ability	to	trace	their	
property	 from	 their	 chose	 in	 action	 against	 the	 bank	 into	 the	 cash	withdrawn	 by	
Cass.109	The	claim	upon	which	the	plaintiff	eventually	succeeded	was	for	money	had	
																																																								
105	Armstrong	v	Winnington	(n	5)	[117].	
106	ibid	[233]	
107	[1991]	2	AC	548.	
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and	 received,110	but	 there	 is	 a	 sharp	 division	 of	 academic	 opinion	 as	 to	 whether	
relief	 was	 granted	 in	 response	 to	 the	 vindication	 of	 a	 property	 right111	or	 in	
response	to	unjust	enrichment.112	
The	 trial	 judge	 in	 Armstrong	 v	 Winnington	 preferred	 the	 proprietary	
restitutionary	analysis	of	Lipkin	Gorman.113	Whilst	Winnington	sought	to	distinguish	
Lipkin	Gorman	by	emphasising	that	the	successful	cause	of	action	in	that	case	(being	
money	 had	 and	 received)	 could	 not	 possibly	 assist	 Armstrong	 in	 its	 claim	 since	
EUAs	are	obviously	not	money,	the	trial	judge	disagreed.	‘[T]here	is	no	reason	why,	
in	an	appropriate	case,	a	claimant	does	not	have	a	personal	claim	at	law	to	vindicate	
his	legal	proprietary	rights	in	respect	of	a	chose	in	action	or	form	of	other	intangible	
property.’114	The	 trial	 judge	 considered,	 however,	 that	 Winnington	 could	 seek	 to	
avail	 itself	of	the	defence	of	bona	fide	purchase	for	value	without	notice,115	though	
he	considered	that	they	could	not	succeed	in	establishing	the	defence	for	much	the	
same	 reasons	 as	 to	why	 he	 found	 them	 liable	 for	 unconscionable	 receipt	 of	 trust	
property.116	Whilst	it	is	not	clear	whether	the	trial	 judge	also	accepted	that	change	
of	position	was	also	a	defence	to	the	proprietary	restitutionary	claim,117	on	the	facts	
and	 for	much	 the	 same	 reasons	 as	 to	why	 the	 bona	 fide	 purchase	 defence	 failed,	
Winnington	also	could	not	make	out	the	defence.118	
Given	 the	 state	of	 the	 law	before	him,	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 fault	 the	 trial	 judge’s	
preference	 for	 the	 proprietary	 restitutionary	 analysis	 of	Lipkin	Gorman.	 However,	
having	 favoured	 such	 an	 analysis,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 understand	why	 the	 trial	 judge	
considered	bona	fide	purchase	a	defence	to	the	claim.	Proponents	of	a	general	bona	
fide	 purchase	 defence	 support	 an	 unjust	 enrichment	 analysis	 of	 the	 claim.119	In	
contrast,	the	principal	proponent	of	the	proprietary	restitutionary	claim	posits	that	
‘[t]he	ambit	of	the	bona	fide	purchase	defence	depends	on	whether	the	proprietary	
restitutionary	claim	is	brought	at	common	law	or	in	equity.’120	This	is	because	‘[t]he	
function	of	the	bona	fide	purchase	defence	is	to	make	good	defects	in	the	defendant’s	
title	 to	 property.’121	On	 this	 view,	 the	 reason	 the	 defence	 was	 available	 in	 Lipkin	
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Gorman	was	because	the	subject	matter	in	that	case	was	money.	As	currency,	122	title	
to	money	is	lost	when	it	passes	into	circulation	as	currency	and	into	the	hands	of	a	
bona	 fide	 purchaser	 for	 value.	 EUAs	 are	 not	 currency.	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
understand	 why	 the	 bona	 fide	 purchase	 defence	 was	 considered	 available	 to	
Winnington	 in	 respect	 of	 Armstrong’s	 proprietary	 restitutionary	 claim.	 	 Another	
possible	explanation	for	the	availability	of	the	bona	fide	purchase	defence	in	Lipkin	
Gorman	lies	in	the	tracing	exercise	employed	to	establish	the	plaintiff’s	case.	On	this	
view,	‘[w]hether	a	claimant’s	right	in	the	asset	originally	received	was	created	upon	
the	 receipt	 or	 survived	 from	 before	 the	 story	 began,	 and	 whether	 it	 was	 an	
immediately	vested	right	or	a	power,	his	right	in	the	substitute	after	non‐consensual	
substitution	is	always	a	power.	It	is	a	power	to	vest	the	currently	traceable	substitute	
in	himself.’	[Emphasis	added.]123	It	is	also	possible	that	the	plaintiff’s	right	in	Lipkin	
Gorman,	is	defeasible	by	a	bona	fide	purchase	defence	because	it	took	the	form	of	a	
power	to	vest	title	in	the	cash,	which	it	should	be	recalled	initially	vested	in	Cass,	in	
itself.	 However,	 the	 trial	 judge	 in	Armstrong	v	Winnington	 had	 rejected	 tracing	 as	
forming	 any	 part	 of	 Armstrong’s	 case, 124 	so	 this	 explanation	 is	 likewise	
unsatisfactory.		
As	to	Armstrong’s	remaining	claim	in	unjust	enrichment,	the	trial	judge	does	
not	appear	 to	have	 reached	any	clear	 conclusion	on	 its	merits	except	 to	hint	 that,	
should	his	analysis	of	Lipkin	Gorman	as	a	proprietary	restitutionary	claim	be	wrong,	
he	would	be	inclined	to	permit	Armstrong’s	claim	on	this	basis.125	As	a	result	of	the	
brevity	of	this	aspect	of	the	decision,126	it	is	difficult	to	evaluate	with	any	confidence.	
Whereas	 the	 trial	 judge	 appears	 to	 accept	 that	 ‘the	 general	 rule	 is	 that	 a	 claim	 in	
unjust	enrichment	is	only	generally	available	where	the	benefit	has	been	provided	
directly	 by	 the	 claimant	 to	 the	 defendant,	 and	 not	 where	 it	 has	 been	 provided	
indirectly	 via	 a	 third	 party’,127	no	 clear	 explanation	 can	 be	 found	 as	 to	 how	 this	
obstacle	is	surmounted	on	the	facts	of	Armstrong	v	Winnington.	The	only	exception	
referred	to	by	the	trial	judge	is	‘the	case	where	the	claimant	has	title	and	can	trace	
through	the	third	party’128	but	we	have	already	seen	that	tracing	had	been	rejected	
as	irrelevant	on	the	facts.129	
4.	THE	AFTERMATH:	THE	EMPEROR’S	NEW	CLOTHES	
	
Partly	in	response	to	the	widespread	cyber	‘theft’	of	carbon	credits,130	a	set	of	
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new	EU	ETS	registry	Regulations	was	promulgated	in	2013.	The	new	Regulations131	
are	intended	to	address	some	of	the	teething	problems	encountered	by	the	EU	ETS.	
It	 is	 notable	 that	 a	 single	 EU	 Registry	 was	 set	 up	 to	 consolidate	 the	 registry	
infrastructure,132	which	is	certainly	laudable.	However,	the	principal	provision	that	
would	be	of	 interest	 to	property	 lawyers	would	be	Article	40.	The	most	obviously	
relevant	provisions	are	Article	40(2)	and	(4).	Article	40(2)	provides	that	the	registry	
record	 provides	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 of	 title	 to	 an	 EUA	 whereas	 Article	 40(4)	
establishes	a	defence	of	good	faith.		
The	 utility	 of	 Article	 40(4)	 has	 been	 doubted	 even	 before	 the	 regulations	
came	 into	 force.	 It	 is	 said	 that	 ‘[t]he	 strength	 of	 this	 protection	 [for	 an	 innocent	
purchaser]	 is	 eroded	by	 (i)	 the	uncertainty	of	 the	meaning	of	 good	 faith,	which	 is	
likely	 to	 be	 different	 in	 each	Member	 State,	 (ii)	 the	 uncertainty	 as	 to	 the	 precise	
approach	applicable	 to	determining	 the	 law	relating	 to	proprietary	 issues	 (e.g.	 lex	
fori	or	 lec	 loci	rei	sitae	 etc.),	 and	 (iii)	 the	 ability	 expressly	 maintained	 by	 [Article	
40(3)]	 to	 allow	 the	 victim	of	 a	 theft	 to	pursue	 claims,	 available	under	 the	 laws	of	
individual	 Member	 States,	 against	 an	 innocent	 purchaser	 (other	 than	 those	 that	
might	 require	 the	 return	 of	 the	 carbon	 credits	 stolen).’133	It	 is	 possible	 that	 the	
criticism	is	understated.	Conflict	of	laws	rules	in	respect	of	intangible	property	have	
always	 been	 somewhat	 limited	 because	 the	 rights	 themselves	 (how	 they	 are	
enforced,	what	defences	are	available,	whether	and	how	they	are	transferable)	are	
always	 the	 province	 of	 the	 law	 governing	 the	 right.134	This	 is	 because	 there	 is	 in	
truth	no	separation	of	thing	and	right	in	intangible	property.	The	right	is	the	res	and	
since	it	is	a	legal	right,	it	must	by	definition	be	created	by	a	legal	system.	Yet	an	EUA	
is	an	intangible	right	without	a	fixed	legal	system.	It,	like	tangible	property	rights,	is	
imbued	with	the	chameleonic	ability	to	adopt	different	governing	laws	as	it	is	traded	
across	 borders	 even	 though,	 unlike	 tangible	 property	 rights,	 no	 identifiable	 thing	
exists	apart	from	the	right.		
Furthermore,	Article	40(2)	and	(3)	is	even	more	disconcerting,	representing	
a	schizophrenic	view	of	 the	nature	of	an	EUA	and	 its	registry	record.	Article	40(2)	
provides	 that	 the	 registry	 record	 is	 only	 prima	 facie	 evidence	 of	 title.	 Yet	 Article	
40(3)	 effectively	 prevents	 any	 rectification	 of	 the	 record,	 thereby	 creating	 the	
oxymoronic	 notion	 of	 an	 unalterable	 inconclusive	 record.	 For	 jurisdictions	 like	
England	and	Wales,	whereby	property	rights	to	intangible	property	represented	by	
non‐conclusive	 accounts	 are	 principally	 ‘enforced’	 through	 either	 ignoring	 the	
accounts	 or	 through	 their	 rectification,	 the	 new	 Regulations	 will	 cause	 great	
consternation.	Whereas	the	difficulty	faced	by	the	court	in	Armstrong	v	Winnington	
may	be	said	to	result	from	the	claimant’s	voluntary	(if	perhaps	ill‐advised)	litigation	
strategy,	 it	 appears	 that	 any	 future	 claimant	 will	 be	 forced	 to	 adopt	 the	 same	
strategy.	Whilst	the	absence	of	a	clear	procedure	for	rectification	of	the	register	as	
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the	primary	means	for	the	protection	of	an	intangible	‘property’	was	lamentable,	the	
present	regulations’	outright	prohibition	of	any	rectification	altogether	is	downright	
deplorable.		
At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 confusing	 state	 of	 affairs	 lies	 the	 failure	 to	 distinguish	
between	an	EUA	and	its	record.	This	confusion	can	be	seen	both	in	Article	40(2)	of	
the	 new	 regulations	 as	 well	 as	 from	 paragraph	 8	 of	 its	 explanatory	 notes	 to	 the	
Regulation.	According	to	Article	40(2),	‘[t]he	dematerialized	nature	of	[an	EUA]	shall	
imply	 that	 the	 record	 of	 the	 Union	 Registry	 shall	 constitute	 prima	 facie	 and	
sufficient	evidence	of	title	over	an	[EUA],’	suggesting	that	the	intangible	nature	of	a	
‘property’	 implies	 that	 any	 record	 of	 it	 may	 constitute	 prima	 facie	 title.	 This	
misunderstands	 both	 intangible	 property	 and	 the	 role	 of	 registers.	 An	 electronic	
record	of	an	 intangible	property	does	not	mean	 that	 it	exists	 in	electronic	 form135	
but	that	its	record	does.	Registration	may	provide	conclusive	proof	of	title,136	prima	
facie	proof	of	title,137	or	no	proof	at	all.138	Indeed,	no	register	is	even	necessary	for	
the	existence	of	intangible	property.139	Its	role	so	far	as	evidencing	title	is	a	matter	
of	 design,	not	 implication.	 Paragraph	 8	 of	 the	 explanatory	 note	 to	 the	 Regulation	
further	provides,	inter	alia:		
Moreover,	 to	 reduce	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	 the	 reversal	 of	 transactions	
entered	in	a	registry,	and	the	consequent	disruption	to	the	system	and	to	the	
market	 that	 such	 reversal	 may	 cause,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 that	
allowances	 and	 Kyoto	 units	 are	 fully	 fungible.	 In	 particular,	 transactions	
cannot	be	reversed,	revoked	or	unwound,	other	than	as	defined	by	the	rules	
of	the	registry,	after	a	moment	set	out	by	those	rules.		
This	 passage	 demonstrates	 a	 fundamental	 misunderstanding	 both	 about	
fungibility	 as	 well	 as	 how	 security	 is	 afforded	 to	 participants	 in	 a	 system	 of	
registration.	 Goode	 has	 remarked	 that	 ‘[t]he	 concept	 of	 fungibility	 is	 well	
established,	 yet	 it	 remains	 imperfectly	understood.	This	 is	…	partly	because	of	 an	
unfortunate	tendency	to	define	fungibility	in	terms	of	the	physical	characteristics	of	
the	 subject‐matter.’140	The	EU	Regulations	goes	 even	 further	 to	 confuse	 fungibility	
with	 specific	 recovery.	 The	 prevention	 of	 specific	 recovery	 does	 not	 imbue	 a	
property	with	 the	 characteristic	 of	 fungibility.	 Otherwise,	 all	 property	 apart	 from	
land	would	be	regarded	as	fungible	in	common	law	systems.		
Likewise,	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	 prevention	 of	 rectification	will	 somehow	
prevent	disruptions	 to	 the	market	 is	 completely	off	 the	mark.	Market	participants	
are	 not	 simply	 concerned	 that	 EUAs	 registered	 in	 their	 accounts	 will	 remain	 so	
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registered.	 They	 are	 concerned	 to	 avoid	 incurring	 liability	 as	 a	 result	 of	 their	
participation	 in	 the	market,	whether	 this	 liability	 takes	 the	 form	of	 rectification	of	
the	 register	 (prohibited	 by	 Article	 40(3)),	 an	 obligation	 to	 transfer	 non‐specific	
EUAs	 (as	 permitted	 by	 Article	 40(3))	 or	 liability	 to	 pay	 monetary	 compensation	
(also	 permitted	 by	 Article	 40(3)).	 Allowing	 EUAs	 to	 remain	 registered	 in	 their	
names	while	 leaving	 them	exposed	 to	other	 forms	of	 liability	provides	a	very	odd	
sort	of	comfort.	In	the	context	of	land	registration,	it	has	been	observed	that	‘it	is	a	
hollow	victory	for	the	registered	proprietor	to	retain	the	land	if	they	have	to	pay	a	
sum	 equivalent	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 land	 in	 terms	 of	 …	 compensation	 to	 the	
defendant.’141		
If	 the	 EU	 truly	 wished	 to	 instill	 confidence	 in	 market	 participants,	 then	 it	
would	do	well	to	explore	the	viability	of	ensuring	the	conclusiveness	of	the	register	
in	the	same	way	that	many	land	registration	schemes	have	provided.	In	order	to	do	
so,	 however,	 it	 would	 also	 have	 to	 seriously	 explore	 the	 situations	 in	 which	 this	
conclusiveness	should	be	withheld.	Where	the	register	is	not	conclusive,	the	remedy	
of	 rectification	 is	 the	 most	 natural	 and	 straightforward.	 The	 rules	 permitting	
rectification	of	a	unified	register	must	themselves	be	unified.	The	EU	must,	in	short,	
abandon	 the	 principle	 of	 subsidiarity.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 will	 simultaneously	 provide	
welcome	clarity	to	market	participants	and	provide	the	EU	with	an	opportunity	to	
optimise	the	EU	ETS.	As	currently	designed,	the	only	party	that	truly	benefits	from	
the	 new	 Regulations	 is	 the	 European	 Commission	 since	 it	 operates	 the	 Union	
Registry	and	is	essentially	protected	from	any	suit	seeking	rectification.	Perhaps,	a	
cynic	might	charge,	that	was	always	the	point.	
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